|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Danish Maritime Security Programme for the Gulf of Guinea, 2022-2026** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Key results:**   * Strengthened national and regional maritime law response to combat piracy and other types of maritime crimes * Deeper police investigations into organisational structures of organised maritime criminal groups and reinforced security at port facilities * Research informed regional dialogue and capacity development strengthens maritime security * Women Peace and Security action in maritime law enforcement * Maritime operational planning and response enhanced to counter piracy in the Gulf of Guinea   **Justification for support:**  The programme will:  - Enhance the capacity and response of selected countries in the Gulf of Guinea relating to piracy and armed robbery at sea, particularly off the coast of Nigeria, which is currently a piracy hot spot.  - The programme will enhance the strategic and legal frameworks and capacities of Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo so that maritime law enforcement responses are enhanced and that justice mechanisms enable alleged criminals to be prosecuted and detained.  - This will contribute to increasing the safety of seafarers and the ease of sea borne trade, thereby contributing to growth in the blue economy and its contribution to development. These aspects will also benefit Danish trade and shipping interests.  **Major risks and challenges:**   * The current weak and incomplete state of the national and regional maritime security architecture means that results may take longer to accrue than anticipated. * Lack of coherence within national priorities may undermine programme objectives and implementation * Possible duplication from other like-minded donors*.* | **File No.** | | |  | | | | | | | | | |
| **Total Commitment** | | | 175 million (80 million ODA + 95 million non-ODA from the Ministry of Defence) | | | | | | | | | |
| **Country** | | | Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo | | | | | | | | | |
| **Responsible Unit** | | | Danish Embassy, Accra | | | | | | | | | |
| **Sector** | | | Stabilisation | | | | | | | | | |
| *DKK mill.* | | | **2022** | **2023** | **2024** | | **2025** | **2026** | | | **Total** | |
| **Commitment, ODA** | | | 12.6 | 20.2 | 18.0 | | 15.3 | 11.0 | | | 80.0 | |
| **Commitment, non-ODA** | | | 15.0 | 20.0 | (20.0) | | (20.0) | (20.0) | | | 35+60 | |
| **Projected ann. Disb.** | | |  |  |  | |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | |  | | | | | | | | | |  | | **Key results:**   * *.* | | **File No.** | |  | | | | | | | **Country** | | Ghana, Nigeria & regional West Africa | | | | | | | **Responsible Unit** | | Danish Embassy, Accra | | | | | | | **Sector** | | Stabilisation | | | | | | | *DKK mill.* | | **2019** | **2020** | **2021** | | **Total** | | | **Commitment** | |  |  |  | |  | | | **Projected ann. Disb.** | |  |  |  | |  | | | **Duration** | | 2019 - 2021 | | | | | | | **Finance Act code.** | |  | | | | | | | **Head of unit** | |  | | | | | | | **Desk officer** | |  | | | | | | | **Financial officer** | |  | | | | | | | **Relevant SDGs** *[Maximum 5 – highlight with grey]* | | | | | | | | | No Poverty | No  Hunger | Good Health, Wellbeing | | | Quality Education | | Gender Equality | | Affordable Clean Energy | Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth | Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure | | | Reduced Inequalities | | Sustainable Cities, Communities | | Climate Action | Life below Water | Life on Land | | | Peace & Justice, strong Inst. | | Partnerships for Goals | | **Strategic objective:** | | | | | | | | | | | *Enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national and regional level*. | | | | | | | | | | |  | | | | | | | | | | | **Engagement** | **Partner** | | | | **Total budget: DKK M** | | | | | | PSE 1 – strengthened maritime law response | UNODC | | | |  | | | | | | PSE 2 – maritime strategies | INTERPOL | | | |  | | | | | | PSE 3 – research, dialogue, training | KAIPTC | | | |  | | | | | | PSE 4 – operational planning & response | Danish Defence | | | |  | | | | | | TA, reviews etc. |  | | | |  | | | | | |  | **Total** | | | | DKK 45million | | | | | | | |  | |
| **Duration** | | | 2021-2026 (60 months) | | | | | | | | | |
| **Finance Act code.** | | |  | | | | | | | | | |
| **Head of unit** | | | Tom Helge Nørring | | | | | | | | | |
| **Desk officer** | | | Birgit La Cour Madsen | | | | | | | | | |
| **Financial officer** | | | Toke Hauch Arnoldi | | | | | | | | | |
| **Relevant SDGs** *[Maximum 5 – highlight with grey]* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Graphical user interface, application, Word  Description automatically generated  No Poverty | | Graphical user interface, application, Word  Description automatically generated  No  Hunger | Good Health, Wellbeing | | Quality Education | | | | Graphical user interface, application, Word  Description automatically generated  Gender Equality | | | |
| Clean Water and Sanitation | | Affordable Clean Energy | Graphical user interface, application, Word  Description automatically generated  Decent Jobs, Econ. Growth | | Graphical user interface, application, Word  Description automatically generated  Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure | | | | Graphical user interface, application, Word  Description automatically generated  Reduced Inequalities | | | |
| Graphical user interface, application, Word  Description automatically generated  Sustainable Cities, Communities | | Responsible  Consumption &  Production | Graphical user interface, application, Word  Description automatically generated  Climate Action | | Graphical user interface, application, Word  Description automatically generated  Life below Water | | | | Life on Land | | | |
| Graphical user interface, application, Word  Description automatically generated  Peace & Justice, strong Inst. | | Partnerships for Goals |  | |  | | | |  | | | |
| **Strategic objective:** | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national and regional level*. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Engagement** | | **Partner** | | | **MFA** | | **MOD** | | | | **Total** | |
| PSE 1 Regional support to criminal justice systems responses | | UNODC | | | 27.7 | | 7,5 | | | | 35,2 | |
| PSE 2 Maritime policing, investigation, and evidence collection | | INTERPOL | | | 25 | |  | | | | 25 | |
| PSE 3 Integrated training and response to maritime threats | | KAIPTC | | | 14.4 | |  | | | | 14.4 | |
| PSE 4 Maritime Domain Awareness and Operational Response | | Danish Defence | | |  | | 70.2 | | | | 70.2 | |
| PSE 4 support to UNODC, pending new Defence Agreement | |  | | |  | | 15 | | | | 15 | |
| TA, reviews etc. | |  | | | 10 | | 2,3 | | | | 12,3 | |
| Unallocated | |  | | | 2.9 | |  | | | | 2.9 | |
|  | | **Total (DKK)** | | | 80 | | 35+60 | | | | 175 | |

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# Abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| AGWE | INTERPOL Maritime Crime Programme in West Africa (since 2015) |
| AIMS | African Union Integrated Maritime Strategy |
| APP | Africa Programme for Peace |
| APSA | African Peace and Security Architecture |
| AU | African Union |
| BMATT | British Military Advisory and Training Team |
| C4I | Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence |
| CESC | Cross-Engagement Steering Committee |
| COVID-19 | Coronavirus Disease 2019 |
| CRESMAC | Centre of Regional Maritime Surveillance for Centre Africa |
| CRESMAO | Centre of Regional Maritime Surveillance for West Africa |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee (by OECD) |
| DCD | Defence Command Denmark |
| DDD | Doing Development Differently |
| DHOM | Deputy Head of Mission |
| DMA | Danish Maritime Authority |
| DMD | Danish Ministry of Defence |
| DMSP | Danish Maritime Security Programme |
| ECCAS | Economic Community of Central African States |
| ECJC | Entire Criminal Justice Chain |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community for West African States |
| EEZ | Exclusive Economic Zone |
| EIMS | ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Security Strategy |
| EMD | ECOWAS Maritime Domain |
| EMSA | European Maritime Safety Agency |
| G7++ FoGG | G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GGC | Gulf of Guinea Commission |
| GMA | Ghana Maritime Authority |
| GMCP | Global Maritime Crime Program (by UNODC) |
| GMSD | INTERPOL Global Maritime Security Database |
| GoG | Gulf of Guinea |
| GOGIN | EU Gulf of Guinea Interregional Network |
| HSOP | Harmonised Standard Operating Procedures |
| IAS | International Accounting Standards |
| ICC | Inter-regional Coordination Centre |
| IFRS | International Reporting Standards |
| IMB | International Maritime Bureau |
| IMO | International Maritime Organisation |
| INL | International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US State Department |
| INTERPOL | The International Criminal Police Organization |
| ISPS | International Ship and Port Facility Security Code |
| IUU | Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated |
| KAIPTC | Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre |
| LIC | low-income countries |
| LMIC | low-middle-income countries |
| MDA | Maritime Domain Awareness |
| MEAL | Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (Plan) |
| MEL | Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning |
| MEND | Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta |
| MLE | Maritime Law Enforcement |
| MMCC | Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre |
| MOC | Maritime Operations Centre |
| MOD | Ministry of Defence |
| MSA | Maritime Situation Awareness |
| MSPA | Maritime Security Programme Advisor |
| MTISC | Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre |
| MTR | Mid Term Review |
| NIMASA | Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency |
| NIMS | National Integrated Maritime Strategy |
| OCIMF | Oil Companies International Marine Forum |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance (according to DAC) |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| PRC | Piracy Reporting Centre of the International Maritime Bureau |
| PSE | Peace and Stabilisation Engagement |
| PSED | Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document |
| PSF | Peace and Stabilisation Fund |
| RDDC | Royal Danish Defence College |
| REC | Regional Economic Community (of the AU) |
| RNOE | Regional Network of Experts (INTERPOL maritime policing) |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goal |
| SEAH | Sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment |
| SOLAS | International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea |
| SOP | Standing Operating Procedures |
| SPOMO Act | Suppression of piracy and other maritime offences act, 2019 (Nigerian Law) |
| SWAIMS | Support to West African Integrated Maritime Strategies |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UMIC | Upper-middle-income countries |
| UN | United Nations |
| UN Women | United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women |
| UNCLOS | UN Convention on the Law of the Sea |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| UNSCR | UN Security Council Resolution |
| US NAVAF | United States Naval Forces Africa |
| USD | United States Dollars |
| VBSS | Visit Board Search and Seizures |
| VDTG | Virtual Donor Technical Group |
| WPS | Women Peace and Security |
| WPSI | Women Peace and Security Institute (at KAIPTC) |

# Introduction

This Programme Document sets out the rationale and proposed structure for a five-year civilian and military stabilisation support programme to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF).

The overall objective of the support is enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at the national and regional levels. It builds on Denmark’s current and previous diplomatic, stabilisation, and development engagements in the region and has been designed to complement Denmark’s other channels of support within an overall funding envelope of DKK 175 million (DKK 80 million Official Development Aid, ODA, and DKK 95 million non-ODA) between January 2022 and December 2026 (60 months). The programme further strengthens Denmark’s contribution to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. These overall commitments increase the average annual disbursements over the five years to 2026 to DKK 16 million for ODA funding (up from an average of DKK 10 million in 2018-2021), and DKK 19 million non-ODA (up from DKK 5.3 in 2018-2021). As regards non-ODA, funding secured under the current Defence Agreement end December 2023 is DKK 35 million (Annex 4).

The programme reinforces Denmark’s commitment to stability, the rule of law and human rights expressed in the Danish Government’s new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020. DMSP 3 continues implementation of Denmark’s whole-of-government approach as described in the [Priority Paper For The Danish Efforts to Combat Piracy and Other Types of Maritime Crime 2019-2022](https://fmn.dk/globalassets/fmn/dokumenter/strategi/pirateri/-prioritypaper-for-the-danish-efforts-to-combat-piracy-and-other-types-of-maritime-crime-2019-2022-.pdf). The programme is aligned with Denmark strategy for development cooperation [The World We Share (2021)](https://um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsID=F401381F-A342-4D38-AA4F-B10A312A6287), and Denmark’s [National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security (2020-2024)](https://fmn.dk/en/topics/women-peace-and-security-1325/) that guides the Danish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Justice. The programme has been prepared in accordance with the [Guidelines for the Peace and Stabilisation Fund](https://amg.um.dk/en/programmes-and-projects/guidelines-for-the-peace-and-stabilisation-fund/) of October 2020.

DMSP 3 is designed around four interlinked peace and stabilisation engagements (PSE):

**PSE 1** – Support to gendered criminal justice system responses to the threat of maritime crime in Benin, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo, through continued engagement with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

**PSE 2** – Supported Regional Maritime Policing in Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo through a new partnership with The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

**PSE 3** – Integrated Responses to Threats to Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Domain through a continues engagement with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)

**PSE 4** – Maritime Domain Awareness, Sustainable Force Generation and Operational Response through direct implementation by Danish Defence under management of Defence Command Denmark.

Compared to DMSP 2, DMSP 3 scales-up Danish engagement financially and covers five years of implementation and a significantly strengthened element of learning-for-adaptive management. The geographically expanded scope of DMSP 3 matches trends in piracy and other maritime crime that increasingly takes place further away from Nigeria’s Niger Delta – the hotbed of piracy in the region. Scaling up is viable through increased strategic alignment with UNODC that will manage and implement ODA and non-ODA funded activities, as well as contribute to strategic monitoring and donor coordination through a regional Monitoring Hub.

The new partnership with INTERPOL (PSE 2) solidifies the Entire Criminal Justice Chain (ECJC) approach that constitutes the backbone of the programme: working towards effective maritime law enforcement starting with detection and interdiction at sea; investigations based on properly secured evidence; prosecutions and detention following applicable rights standards and rehabilitation approaches. By assisting the region's countries to address the weak links in their national and regional criminal justice chains, the programme contributes to the efforts of the region to address piracy and other maritime crime within the Yaoundé frameworks.

The partnerships with UNODC and INTERPOL furthermore will give the programme the expanded geographical footprint needed because these organisations have ongoing engagements in the four francophone countries to be included. Ghana and Nigeria are maintained as core countries. The programme expands to include Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo by leveraging UNODC and INTERPOL[[1]](#footnote-2) ongoing engagements in maritime law and order sectors of those countries (Annex 2).

Regional and national cooperation spans across the full ECJC spectrum. The ‘hard end’ military engagement (i.e., non-ODA under PSE 4) in maritime law enforcement is through training of Maritime Interception Operations that require regular navy and integrated military-civilian maritime law enforcement teams to be able to collaborate, including on handing over suspects. Under PSE 1, UNODC will ensure a stronger linkage between arrest and conviction. DMSP 3 incorporates training on policing skills and collaboration with INTERPOL’s existing regional presence. This includes evidence collection and capacity building to conduct on-sea and on-land maritime investigation into maritime crime networks and finance and related collusion and corruption.

The engagement with KAIPTC leverages the regional role and convening power of this African Centre for Peacekeeping that has a solid track record of conducting policy and practice related research and apply this knowledge to training development and convening policy fora. The aim is to foster stronger, more cohesive, and effective national and regional approaches to maritime security and an enhanced rate of implementation of the Yaoundé process. Synergies exist with the other engagements of the DMSP 3 and will particularly be sought exploited through joint research and training with UNODC on Women Peace and Security, and collaboration with UNODC,the Royal Danish Defence College and other relevant regional and international actors on policy driven thematic reports to be co-published with Danish authorities.

# Strategic considerations and justification

## Context for the programme

The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) is a vast maritime zone of 2.3 million square kilometres and 6,000 kilometres of coastline.[[2]](#footnote-3) The Gulf of Guinea sea basin countries include low-income countries (LIC), i.e., Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Togo, low-middle-income countries (LMIC), i.e., Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Sao Tomé and Principe and Senegal, and upper-middle-income countries (UMIC), i.e., Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. According to the World Bank (2020), the total population in these countries is 464 million, with more than 4 out of 10 people living in Nigeria. The Gulf’s sea basin is an essential resource for fisheries and is part of a critical sea route for transporting goods between West and Central Africa and the rest of the world. Its geo-political and geo-economic importance has grown since it has become a strategic hub in global and regional energy trade. Every day, nearly 1.500 fishing vessels, cargo ships and tankers navigate its waters.

The region’s maritime affluence has made it attractive to both state and non-state actors. Some of them exploit the inadequate control of the region’s maritime domain to engage in illicit activity. Maritime crime is a significant threat to seafarers, international trade, and sustainable economic growth in the Gulf of Guinea region. About 90 per cent of the region’s international trade is moving by sea. The region has become the world’s piracy hotspot and accounted for more than 40 per cent of all piracy-related incidents and 90 per cent of all kidnappings at sea in 2020.

The Gulf of Guinea experienced a nearly 50 per cent increase in kidnapping for ransom between 2018 and 2019 and around a 10 per cent increase between 2019 and 2020. The region now accounts for just over 90 per cent of all kidnappings for ransom at sea. Despite efforts by coastal countries and external actors, the Gulf of Guinea remains highly insecure with acts of piracy now extending from Ivory Coast to Congo-Brazzaville. Twenty-five successful piracy attacks resulted in 142 kidnapped seafarers in 2020.[[3]](#footnote-4)

The International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) latest global piracy report records 38 incidents since the start of 2021 – compared with 47 incidents during the same period last year. In the first three months of 2021, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) reported 33 vessels boarded, two attempted attacks, two vessels fired upon, and one vessel hijacked. Danish and international efforts to combat piracy and other maritime crimes have contributed to significant drops[[4]](#footnote-5) in the number of global piracy and maritime crime incidents and saw the first convictions of ten pirates in [Nigeria](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-piracy-idUSKCN2581EL) in July 2021 and nine more pirates in [Togo](https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/nine-pirates-convicted-in-a-first-of-its-kind-trial-in-west-africa) in July 2021. Nigeria faces numerous security challenges in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 217,000 square kilometres and in the waterways and creeks of the Niger Delta. The Delta’s economy contributes USD 400 billion to Nigerian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually, of which oil and gas production represents 9 per cent.

The **political economy**[[5]](#footnote-6) **of** piracy and other maritime crime at sea is influenced by the fact that root causes can be found on dry land rather than at sea. Studies, including the study by UNODC “[Pirates of the Niger Delta – between brown and blue water](https://www.unodc.org/res/piracy/index_html/UNODC_GMCP_Pirates_of_the_Niger_Delta_between_brown_and_blue_waters.pdf)” funded by Denmark and co-published with the Danish MFA, show that piracy tends to be conducted or supported by marginalised communities that have not participated in economic development. In the Niger Delta, socioeconomic underdevelopment is in sharp contrast to the vast oil and gas wealth concentrated in the hands of foreign oil majors and regional political elites. The Niger Delta is one of the most polluted in the world.Environmental degradation related to oil pollution of the marine environment is a driver of conflict because it has depleted the fishing and water resources that people have traditionally depended on for their livelihoods. This juxtaposition was a major motivating factor for early militant groups operating in the region. In 2005, the politically motivated Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) started staging attacks against oil and gas infrastructure. This includes ‘petro-piracy’ (targeting vessels to steal oil cargo).There has been a shift from ‘petro piracy’ to ‘kidnap & ransom piracy’ as a new deep offshore piracy business model. Between 2016 and 2021, hostage for ransom has affected markedly more non-Nigerians in this business model yearon year. Niger Delta-based deep offshore pirate group’s illicit gains amounted to roughly USD 4 million in ransom payments in 2020 alone.

The region thus has continued to experience increased incidents of piracy and other maritime crimes at an alarming rate, including drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, fisheries crimes, and human trafficking and smuggling of migrants. Consequently, the overall maritime situation in the Gulf of Guinea region is deteriorating with rising numbers of piracy and other maritime crimes occurring unabated. Piracy and other maritime crime related financial flows feed on land crime networks of kingpins, sponsors interlinked with corrupt officials, have become bolder and more capable *deep offshore pirates,* who target international shipping traffic. They are coupled with *coastal low-reach pirates,* who operate up to 40 nautical miles from shore and primarily target local vessels. The coastal states do not yet possess the capacity to exercise sufficient authority at sea.

**Corruption and collusion** are enabling factors underpinning a range of organized crime activities, including piracy and the oil theft business, particularly for top-level actors such as ex-militants, sponsors, and protectors. Corruption and the structure of pirate groups are two sides of the illicit coin made. Kingpins and Sponsors are responsible for organizing and providing the financial support to launch piracy attacks. Actors at this level may include high-level ex-militants, who help facilitate piracy incidents, for example, by making funds available for initial investments (equipment, fuel, weapons, etc.). Actors at this level are likely also critical in providing protection and cover for these pirate groups. Other roles include a hierarchy of Group Leaders overseeing initial attacks against vessels, including the kidnapping of seafarers. Specialized Team Members possess specific skill sets, such as navigation or engineering capabilities or the ability to hang grappling ladders on vessels being attacked. Attack Team General Members, and Camp Guards and Onshore Support Roles are used following a successful kidnapping operation and manage operations at the hostage camps onshore in the Niger Delta. These roles guard captive hostages and provide general operating support for the camp. The larger share of pirate money streams goes to sponsors and kingpins. Collusion practices include pirates paying certain members of official security forces to “turn a blind eye” to various parts of the criminal activities of pirate groups.

Inadequate law enforcement capacity, underdeveloped legislation, and limited policy implementation have weakened governance, corruption, and political instability. Consequently, the region is plagued by a litany of maritime threats, such as those identified by the United Nations General Assembly: illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy/armed robbery at sea, pollution/toxic waste dumping, human trafficking, illicit trades in arms, drugs, and contraband, and terrorist acts involving shipping, offshore installations, and other maritime interests.[[6]](#footnote-7)

The pervasiveness of maritime security threats across the region illustrates the need for a holistic approach to maritime security response in the region, including sustainable development of the blue economy, improvement of the well-being of coastal communities, and commitment and collaboration across agencies and governments.[[7]](#footnote-8)

Maritime insecurity directly impacts Danish foreign policy interests as Danish shipping companies, port operators, and providers of offshore supplies and services have significant interests and substantial presence in the Gulf of Guinea region. In 2019, 5 per cent of Danish shipping exports were to West Africa, equivalent to DKK 10 billion. At any given time, an estimated 30-40 Danish operated vessels are in the Gulf of Guinea, making more than 2,600 port calls a year.

The activities of pirates and other criminals at sea are not only plaguing the Gulf of Guinea, but also have dire economic consequences for coastal countries, the local population and international shipping companies and its seafarers, including Danish companies, who have invested millions of dollars in contracting security personnel and paying insurance premiums for their vessel and crew. With the rising number of piracy and maritime crime incidents in the region, international support for national and regional maritime security initiatives will be crucial in ensuring improved maritime security in the region.

Many challenges have contributed to the growing maritime insecurity in the region, a central one being the absence of anti-piracy legislation, which makes it difficult to prosecute pirates and other maritime criminals. After the adoption of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, maritime laws or amendments to penal codes were expected to be implemented throughout West Africa to standardize legal regimes. Yet, only Nigeria, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cape Verde are the only five countries in ECOWAS having passed anti-piracy legislation until now, making it challenging to deter and convict piracy responses in the region.

The DMSP 3 is a programme that approaches this complexity from a stabilisation perspective and supports regional cooperation on naval and maritime law enforcement operational collaboration and capacities in across the criminal justice chain (see Chapter 4).

## Strategic policy framework

The DMSP 3 aligns with key Danish, regional and global frameworks relating to maritime security.

### Global and European frameworks

The programme’s global and European policy reference framework includes a series of United Nations (UN), International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and European Union (EU) instruments.

The [UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)](https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm#:~:text=by%20%22*%22.-,The%20United%20Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea,the%20oceans%20and%20their%20resources.&text=The%20Convention%20was%20opened%20for,1982%20in%20Montego%20Bay%2C%20Jamaica.) sits at the apex of the global normative framework. UN Security Council Resolutions, UNSCR [2018](http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2018) on Peace and Security (2011) in Africa, and [2039](http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2039) on Peace consolidation in West Africa (2012), require coastal states and the wider international community to cooperate on addressing piracy and robbery at sea in line with a rule of law and human rights-based approach. In relation to [Agenda 2030](https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda), Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in focus include SDG 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions), SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 17 (partnerships), and indirectly SDG 14 (Life below water).

The [IMO Strategy for implementing sustainable maritime security measures in West and Central Africa](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/WestAfrica.aspx) aims to support regional efforts in line with IMO Resolution A.1069(28) on the Prevention and Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity in the Gulf of Guinea, including via the development of maritime strategies and procedures. This includes support to the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea [(SOLAS)](https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx) and the International Ship and Port Security [(ISPS)](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx).[[8]](#footnote-9)

The [EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (2014)](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/28734/141582.pdf) aims at helping states in strengthening their maritime capabilities, the rule of law, and effective governance through effective multiagency cooperation, as set out in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.

### Danish policy framework

The DMSP 3 continues implementation of Denmark’s whole-of-government approach as described in the [Priority Paper For The Danish Efforts to Combat Piracy and Other Types of Maritime Crime 2019-2022](https://fmn.dk/globalassets/fmn/dokumenter/strategi/pirateri/-prioritypaper-for-the-danish-efforts-to-combat-piracy-and-other-types-of-maritime-crime-2019-2022-.pdf). The Priority Paper was prepared under the auspices of four Danish ministries: The Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs, and Ministry of Justice. The overall objective of Denmark’s efforts to combat piracy and maritime crime is to reduce the threat stemming from these issues to protect Danish interests and seafarers as well as international shipping. To a large extent, increased Danish trade to the region depends upon a secure and cost-effective maritime supply chain and the freedom of navigation. Therefore, maritime security in the region must be strengthened by improving regional coordination, building national and regional governance capabilities, and implementing strategies to enhance the sustainable protection and utilisation of the region’s blue economy. Stated Danish policy priorities include strengthening of regional capabilities and capacities in the short and medium-term through supporting Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Response and long-term institutional strengthening of maritime governance and law enforcement. Denmark furthermore supports local authorities in building naval capacities to prevent and deter pirates and ensure that piracy and other maritime criminal acts are met with sufficient punitive responses. The programme aligns with Denmark strategy for development cooperation [The World We Share (2021)](https://um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsID=F401381F-A342-4D38-AA4F-B10A312A6287), and Denmark’s [National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security (2020-2024)](https://fmn.dk/en/topics/women-peace-and-security-1325/) that guides the Danish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Justice.

### Regional policy frameworks

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has developed an [ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy](https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/EIMS-English-final.pdf) (EIMS), which is consistent with the [2050 African Union Integrated Maritime Strategy](https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/33832-wd-african_union_3-1.pdf) (2050 AIMS) and responds to UNSCRs [2018](http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2018) and [2039](http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2039). Based on these regional and international instruments, Gulf of Guinea states and regional bodies have developed and are implementing initiatives to strengthen capacity and improve the operational architecture of institutions responsible for maritime security.

In 2013, Gulf of Guinea states adopted the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to provide a regional approach to prevent piracy and other maritime crimes. The Code of Conduct, among other things, encourages Gulf of Guinea states to develop a comprehensive anti-piracy and maritime crime response through the development of domestic laws, regulations and regional framework to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea, including information sharing and operational coordination mechanisms. As part of the measures to strengthen regional cooperation among GoG states, a memorandum of understanding was signed between ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) in 2013. The Yaoundé Architecture established by the memorandum seeks to create shared maritime domain awareness among regional states through synergy in approaches to maritime security among West and Central African states, coordination and implementation of joint activities, regular exchange of information and experience sharing and harmonization of laws on piracy and other illegal activities at sea among others.

### National capacities and commitment

Implementation of the regional maritime security architecture currently developing in the Gulf of Guinea depends upon the commitment of coastal states to prioritise and develop national capacities. This consist of inter-agency arrangements including cooperation principles and legal, operational, and administrative flexibility to interact regionally. Handover arrangements between the Gulf of Guinea countries are an essential aspect of an effective criminal justice chain.

Naval and coastguard capabilities are generally low outside of territorial waters, except for Nigeria that in recent years has invested significantly in enhancing maritime security in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). General operational constraints in the region include inadequate types of ships and low standards of operational readiness of military and civil maritime vessels and crews. These shortcomings can be due to poor maintenance and shortages of basic requirements, such as fuel. The effect of this varies, but generally it reduces the number and readiness of vessels able to go to sea. Coverage improves in proximity to the coastline and where there are offshore installations such as oil platforms.

Ghana's navy received notable upgrades since the discovery of offshore oil deposits in 2012, including newer patrol vessels. Unfortunately, the maintenance of these vessels has not been given priority. Possibly impacted by recent Nigerian efforts, piracy cases outside Nigerian waters have risen in later years, resulting in Ghana announcing plans to purchase additional navy vessels and acquire a maritime patrol aircraft. The aim is the protection of the offshore industries and anchorage areas. In the west, the navy tries to have 24/7 coverage of the large western oil fields. In eastern territorial waters, patrols are conducted on an irregular basis. Still, recent developments have raised awareness of more frequent patrols, especially around the leading container port of Tema, where the modern and partly Maersk-funded terminal opened in June 2020.

Nigeria's navy is by far the largest in the region, including patrol boats for riverine operations throughout the Niger Delta and larger ships for offshore operations. Nevertheless, the navy has historically suffered from a lack of funding. Although operations continue to be hampered by a lack of vessels, intelligence, operational readiness, and training (basic to advanced), capabilities are improving. The Nigerian Navy is increasingly likely to respond to incidents. This increased responsiveness is especially the result of the official launch in June 2021 of the highly anticipated Integrated National Security and Waterways Protection Infrastructure, the Deep Blue Project, under the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA). Designed for the total spectrum of maritime security and better maritime domain awareness, including intelligence, the Deep Blue Project is the first intergovernmental and integrated maritime security project in West and Central Africa. The aim is to counter the ongoing threats of piracy and robbery using the latest technologies to operate in the EEZ. Upgrading of equipment involves a USD 195 million acquisition scheme of two large ocean patrol vessels, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and two maritime patrol aircraft. Furthermore, the Deep Blue Project includes training response forces and implementing a Command, Control, Computer Communication, and Information (C4I) Operation Centre and intelligence element to coordinate maritime security efforts across agencies.

There has been progress in Ghana and Nigeria towards implementing the Yaoundé Code of Conduct on adopting national maritime strategies and legislation on prosecuting offenders of maritime crime.

In May 2021, Ghana’s inter-ministerial National Maritime Security Committee (NMSC) through the DMSP 2 approved Harmonised Standard Operation Procedures (HSOP) across all maritime stakeholders in Ghana. The next step is the approval of the Maritime Security Strategy, including legislating acts to prosecute pirates and the over-arching National Integrated Maritime Strategy, which have all received support through the DMSP 2 via UNODC.

Besides the Deep Blue Project of 2021, Nigeria in 2019 approved the comprehensive *Suppression of piracy and other maritime offences act (SPOMO Act)*, making it possible to prosecute piracy and acts of maritime crime. Through the intervention of especially the UNODC, the death penalty was removed from the Act. In July 2021, Nigeria completed the first piracy conviction, sentencing 10 pirates to 12 years in prison.

On the regional level, UNODC supports an ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Handover agreement as an addendum to the 1994 ECOWAS Extradition Treaty ratified in all 15 West African States. The Supplementary Act on Handover agreement will allow the ECOWAS States to hand over suspects of piracy and other maritime crimes. International navies with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with ECOWAS on this Act can hand over suspected pirates and other maritime criminals for prosecution in ECOWAS countries with anti-piracy legislation in place. Such prosecution is currently possible in Nigeria, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cape Verde.

All DMSP 3 beneficiary countries (core countries Ghana and Nigeria, and new countries Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo) are committed to implementing the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. In addition to substantive involvement in Ghana’s and Nigeria’s maritime security and justice law and order sector, UNODC and INTERPOL are vital supporters of Yaoundé related actions in Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo. INTERPOL through hands-on mentorship, donation of equipment and analytical input on maritime investigations, and the creation of a Regional Network of Experts (RNOE). UNODC through legal training of civil maritime law enforcement agencies, support to legal reforms, and supply of information technology. In Togo, UNODC supported exercises at sea with satellite imageries, simulated trials and expertise in Case Management Systems contributed to a seminal trial in Togo in which nine pirates were sentenced in the Appeal Court of Lomé on July 5, 2021.

## The Yaoundé Architecture

Danish maritime security engagements are situated within the Yaoundé Architecture and prioritised accordance with Danish interest. These interests include a continued geographical concentration on Ghana (Zone F) and Nigeria (Zone E), where the DMSP 2 had its geographical operational focus, apart from the regional dialogues and training conducted by KAIPTC. Expanded regional reach in DMSP 3 is achieved by leveraging the geographical scope of current UNODC and INTERPOL activities, which has been ongoing in at least the last four years. This means that DMSP 3 will expand to also, in addition to Ghana and Nigeria, include Benin, Cameroon[[9]](#footnote-10), Côte d’Ivoire and Togo (see Map and Table 1).

The Yaoundé Architecture comprises of the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (ICC), the ECOWAS Regional Maritime Security Centre (CRESMAO), the ECCAS Regional Centre of Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC), and a series of Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCCs’) based on a zonal approach through which coastal states are grouped into six zones. The MMCCs are linked to national Maritime Operation Centres (MOC) in each West- and Central African country. The overall purpose of this arrangement is to provide a mechanism whereby maritime information can be passed to neighbouring states and responses to illegal activity, environmental threats and other incidents that may arise can be coordinated effectively. By these means, the arrangement aims to strengthen cooperation and coordination of maritime safety and security in the shared maritime area of Central and West Africa. However, these regional and national responses are at best incoherent and uncoordinated. Relationships among regional and national structures of the maritime security sector is limited and sometimes non-existent. Thus, despite all these efforts, gaps in the national and regional maritime security structures have contributed to the exacerbation of piracy and maritime crimes, which continue to pose serious security threat in the Gulf of Guinea.

Map 1 – Yaoundé Architecture map

Map

Description automatically generated

*Source:* [*https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/security-defence-crisis-response/52490/eu-maritime-security-factsheet-gulf-guinea\_en*](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/security-defence-crisis-response/52490/eu-maritime-security-factsheet-gulf-guinea_en)

Table 1 – Yaoundé Architecture indicating DMSP 3 beneficiary countries

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (ICC)** Located: Yaoundé, Cameroon | | | | | |
| *The ICC is in the process of being fully established and has the task of coordinating this work, but there is still some way to go and the capacity at national level varies greatly from one country to another, as does the nature of the maritime threat. Currently, only the MMCC in Zone D (in Cameroon) has reached full operational capability with MMCC’s in Ghana (Zone F) and Benin (Zone E) being operational but staffed only by nationals.* | | | | | | |
|  | **West-Africa - CRESMAO** | | |  | **Central Africa - CRESMA** | |
|  | Oversight by ECOWAS | | |  | Oversight by ECCAS | |
|  | Located in Abidjan Côte d’Ivoire | | |  | Located in Point Noir, DRC | |
|  | Status: Partially operational | | |  | Status: Established and partially operational | |
|  | **Zone G** | **Zone F** | **Zone E** |  | **Zone D** | **Zone A** |
|  | Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali | Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Burkina Faso | Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Niger |  | Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon | Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola |
|  | MMCC located in Cape Verde | MMCC located in Tema, Ghana | MMCC located in Cotonou, Benin |  | MMCC located in Doula, Cameroon | MMCC location to be decided |
|  | **Status:**  Being established | **Status:**  Partially operational | **Status:**  Partially operational |  | **Status:**  Fully operational | **Status:**  Being established |
| **PSE 1 (UNODC-MFA)** |  | **Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana** | **Togo, Benin, Nigeria** |  | **Cameroon** |  |
| **PSE 1 (UNODC-DCD)**  **Outcome 3 VBSS** |  | **Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana** | **Togo, Benin, Nigeria** |  | **Cameroon** |  |
| **PSE 2 (INTERPOL)** |  | **Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana** | **Togo, Benin, Nigeria** |  |  |  |
| **PSE 3 (KAIPTC)** |  | **Gulf of Guinea regional** | **Gulf of Guinea regional** |  |  |  |
| **PSED 4 (DCD)** |  | **Ghana** | **Nigeria** |  |  |  |

## Other actors

In response to the security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea, key international actors, including the European Union, United States, United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, and the Netherlands, have played an active role in supporting the implementation of national and regional maritime security initiatives. The United Nations and international agencies, including UNODC, IMO, and INTERPOL, are also active in the region.

The European Union current program, Support to West African Integrated Maritime Security (SWAIMS), is operationalised, among others, through the UNODC and to some extent INTERPOL, to implement the Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in the West and Central Africa project, which was initiated in 2019 running until to 2023. The objective of the project is to ensure that governance and law enforcement frameworks are strengthened, and prosecution and adjudication of maritime crimes are more successful at regional and national levels. The SWAIMS programme includes capacity building for prosecutors and judges, cooperation with other prosecuting states, and support to potential handover of suspected pirates. Furthermore, support to drafting of Harmonised Standard Operating Procedures (HSOP) for prosecutors and maritime law enforcement; drafting of Memorandum of Agreement between countries on operations at sea, and hand-over to prosecuting states; preparing of a Manual on evidence collection for admissibility in different court systems; and support to future potential piracy trials and finally capacity building and equipping of maritime law enforcement (MLE) agencies in West African countries.

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided funding to support a legal advisor with the ICC in Cameroon and its Division for Legal Affairs and Judicial Cooperation. The legal advisor has worked to increase coordination and communication between maritime agencies in the region and to follow up on the initiated legal reform on piracy and maritime crime. The Norwegian funded legal advisor post ended in December 2018. Under the mentioned EU SWAIMS programme, UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) has included a legal advisor post within the ICC, which will take this first initiative forward and focus on regional coordination among legal focal points, follow up on piracy legislation and support training. This is in line with the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other international maritime instruments, within a regional context. GMCP has a proposal in with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to continue supporting the ICC by embedding a training advisor within the ICC Division for Training and Practice.

IMO, in December 2013, unanimously adopted resolution A.1069(28) on Prevention and suppression of piracy, armed robbery against ships and illicit maritime activity in the Gulf of Guinea. The related IMO trust fund assists States in the Gulf of Guinea to develop their national and regional capabilities to improve maritime governance in waters under their jurisdiction. This includes preventing, within the provisions of international law, piracy, armed robbery against ships and other illicit maritime activities, and assisting States to build capacity to interdict and bring to justice those who commit crimes.

Funded by the US, INTERPOL in Project AGWE (2015-2023) is assisting and enhancing maritime law enforcement capabilities in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo. The project aims at linking first responders, investigators, and prosecutors, and increasing cross-border collaboration. Activities include:

(a) *Training* using established international methodologies of investigating and prosecuting maritime piracy and other maritime-based organized crime,

(b) *Mock crime scenes and trials* with INTERPOL (and UNODC) experts creating scenarios based on real cases that occurred in the region, and provide “evidence” for first responders, law enforcement officials and prosecutors to practice the application of the law,

(c) *Exchange visits, investigative meetings, and case coordination meetings*, where officials from beneficiary countries work side by side with their colleagues in other countries and discuss cases of common interest or concern.

## Past results and lessons learned

Denmark has supported initiatives to improve maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea region since 2016. With the DMSP 1 (2016-2018) Denmark supported the EU Gulf of Guinea Interregional Network (GOGIN) and the port security program through the IMO West Africa Trust Fund. The geographical scope of DMSP 1 was the countries from Cape Verde in the east through West and Central Africa to Angola in the south. During the same period, the Danish Defence contributed to the US-led capacity building activity OBANGAME EXPRESS series and in bilateral engagements in various ways. In addition, the Danish Navy conducted Maritime Operations Planning Courses in 2017 and 2018 to improve the ability of the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea to plan maritime operations in cooperation with the other coastal states in the region. Togo and Benin participated in these exercises.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen managed DMSP 1 through delegated EU and IMO implementation. A central lesson from DMSP 1 was that Danish interest in the Gulf of Guinea are better served with a decentralised implementation set-up anchored in the Embassy in Accra. In contrast to DMSP 1, DMSP 2, therefore, was the first embassy-level managed programme.

Assisted by the Embassy in Abuja and especially the posted Military Attaché, the DMSP 2 focussed more narrowly on Ghana and Nigeria. A series of KAIPTC training modules also targeted Benin, Ivory Coast and Togo. This geographical demarcation allowed increased attention to especially national agendas to comply with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and allowed the embassies to conduct oversight.

In 2020 adding DKK 1.7 million non-ODA to the DMSP 2, Denmark increased efforts to train Special Forces in Ghana and Nigeria to increase Maritime Domain Awareness in the two countries. In 2021, a special representative on maritime security and additionally DKK 10 million in non-ODA funding was also given to establish permanent Visit-Board-Search and Seizure (VBSS) bilingual regional training facilities in Nigeria and Ghana for Zone E and F, respectively, as part of the UNODC bridging project to DMSP 3. The additional funding came alongside the announcement of the Danish Government to deploy of a Danish frigate to the Gulf of Guinea for a period of 6 months with the mission of enhancing maritime security.

The current DMSP 2 (2019-2021) of the Gulf of Guinea maritime security program was reviewed in the second quarter of 2021 and identified several lessons.

Management arrangements

* Regarding the DMSP 2 decentralised management set-up, the review concluded that the decentralised management set-up of the programme and the presence and use of embedded experts in the region by UNODC were key factors of success.[[10]](#footnote-11)
* Embassy-level project systems for monitoring and reporting have been established, including an arrangement to house the monitoring and evaluation function of the programme at KAIPTC. While the arrangement produced mandatory engagement, programme and financial reports, the review recommended strengthening monitoring and evaluation arrangements and procedures.
* Key to the success of the decentralised management in its first iteration as part of DMSP 2 was a unique arrangement that permitted the Maritime Growth Advisor of the Danish Maritime Sector Programme to support implementation. This arrangement is no longer available for DMSP 3.
* Locally available maritime security expertise remains crucial. Indeed, the 2021 review concluded that without such expertise, DMSP 3 implementation would be at risk.
* The lesson applied in DMSP 3 is that a internationally recruited maritime security programme adviser could perform the necessary day-to-day project management, coordination, and communication functions. This is possible now that decentralised partnerships have been operating for 3 years under DMSP 2. Monitoring and reporting procedures implemented in DMSP 2 provide a basis for a robust monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) set-up for DMSP 3.

Operational focus

* The 2021 review found that the strengths of the partnership with UNODC lie in operational and technical expertise based in the region. This presence provides a readiness to operationalise national maritime strategies through implementation plans and dissemination. The expertise lies within legal matters. Other organisations have a comparative advantage in pursuing both the political and the political economy processes related to finalising national maritime strategies. In applying these lessons, investment in endorsing national maritime security strategies is not part of DMSP 3.
* A key learning point in DMSP 2 was that an implementation period of three years was too short to ensure sufficient time to on-board new countries and partners and ensure impact and sustainability across the various engagements. Experience from like-minded programmes such as EU’s GOGiN programme, UNODC’s SWAIMS programme and Interpol’s AGWE project indicates that a five-year timeline for DMSP 3 would be more suitable as an implementation period because it provides better time for adaptive management and achieving the sought-after results.

Entire Criminal Justice Chain and enabling existing collaboration

* A key lesson learned is the need for Danish support in the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain to support more countries in West Africa in their ability to execute across the *entire* criminal justice chain. Support is needed from detection and indicting maritime criminals to investigations, crime scene preservation, evidence collection, handover of evidence, prosecution, and detention. Weaknesses in the justice chain call for a more robust maritime policing link. The approach taken in DMSP 3 is to strengthen the working relationship of UNODC and INTERPOL, especially on VBSS (see chapter 4).
* DMSP 3 now fully aligns with UNODC’s Entire Criminal Justice Chain approach by engaging with INTERPOL on maritime policing and investigations so that the two partners will be enabled to work closer together.
* A more robust engagement on investigative capacities in the beneficiary countries, and cross-border collaboration between national law enforcement agencies, is needed to (a) ensure that proper and admissible crime evidence is collected so that apprehended maritime criminals can be prosecuted. Importantly, however, greater investigative capacities are needed for more complex investigations to dismantle the on-land crime networks and prosecute kingpins and enablers that organise and benefit from individual acts of piracy and other maritime crimes.

Regionality and opportunities for scaling up capacity building

* The number of kidnappings at sea reported in the Gulf increased by 40 per cent between 2019 and 2020. The spread of attacks take place beyond Nigerian waters, the former epicentre and further at sea even beyond the jurisdiction of any nation.
* Maritime crimes are inherently border crossing and thus have international dimensions. DMSP 2 increased operational attention on Ghana and Nigeria in DMSP 2. Through DMSP 2’s engagement with KAIPTC, the programme also included research in Benin and Côte d’Ivoire and training on maritime security for senior officials from these two francophone countries that have given Denmark credit and good contacts that will be built on in DMSP 3. Moreover, maritime law enforcement personnel from Togo and Côte d’Ivoire.
* Efforts in DMSP 3 can build on the initial engagements with Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo that need to be scaled up and broadened to enhance compliance with the Yaoundé Architecture and more effectively address piracy and ensure regional coordination and cooperation on the prosecution of pirates and maritime criminal offenders.
* Denmark has responded to the increased risks outside Nigerian waters by being the leading country to support establishing permanent VBSS bilingual regional training facilities in Nigeria and Ghana for Zone E and F, respectively, as part of the UNODC bridging project. This prior Danish investment enables DMSP 3 to expand its geographical scope. The UNODC engagement will cover additional countries in Zone E and F (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo) and Cameroon in Zone D. By including Cameroon, DMSP 3 responds to the widening impact of piracy emanating from Nigeria and the infamous Niger Delta, where most piracy groups reside.
* The programme expansion leverages UNODC and INTERPOL ongoing engagements in those countries' maritime law and order sectors (Annex 2).

Expanded Danish whole-of-government action

* DMSP 3 needs to be cognisant of (i) new and next generation US maritime security initiatives; (ii) the scaling up of Danish diplomatic engagement through the appointment of a Special Representative for Maritime Security; and (iii) the scaling up of Danish military engagements, i.e., the deployment of a Danish frigate in the latter part of 2021.

Women Peace and Security

* The ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy provides an entry point for alignment on women, peace, and security (WPS). However, current WPS National Action Plans of Nigeria and Ghana do not offer immediate opportunities for alignment. This would require policy engagement. Applying WPS considerations in maritime security engagements is increasingly recognised as a gap to be addressed. There is an opportunity to spearhead operational, analytical studies and enhance current partnerships leveraging WPS synergies with ongoing Danish WPS-focused support to Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), including through collaboration with the Civilian Military Advisor (CMA) in Nigeria. Moreover, UNODC gender and WPS programming on maritime security in Asia is more advanced, and these good practices can be valuable to draw on in the Gulf of Guinea. As part of the UN Development System. UNODC furthermore is primed to draw on technical expertise from UN Women.

COVID-19 preparedness

* As regard COVID-19 response and preparedness going forward, adaptive programming by the programme’s management, Defence Command Denmark (DCD), UNODC and KAIPTC have laid a sound foundation for meeting ongoing and current constraints and risks. Partners have gained skills and experience to deliver despite COVID-19 impacts. DMSP 3 will build on the foresight to expedite UNODC’s installation of video teleconferencing equipment for nine maritime security agencies in Ghana, and eight of such agencies in Nigeria. A lesson has been learned that online conferencing and meetings add value and can save costs, regardless of COVID-19 driven considerations.

Research-based dialogue informing further and future activities

* Key results from the regional KAIPTC engagement include that 190 mid-career practitioners in the maritime security sector and civil society advocates in 13 coastal states in West and Central Africa were trained. KAIPTC’s maritime research has informed further development of its maritime security training curriculum. A total of 10 research papers on a variety of maritime security have been, or are about to be, published on a dedicated DMSP portal.[[11]](#footnote-12) KAIPTC organised four-policy and peer-learning fora organized that assembled key actors in the maritime domain in West and Central Africa at the decision-making level for formal and informal collaboration.
* A key research product of the DMSP 2 was the comprehensive study on piracy in the Niger Delta and deep offshore piracy carried out by UNODC and the Centre for Military Studies at Copenhagen University. Published in June 2021, the study [*Pirates of the Niger Delta – between brown and blue waters*](https://www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria/documents/UNODC_Pirates_of_the_Niger_Delta_between_brown_and_blue_waters.pdf) spearheaded an UN-labelled categorization of West African piracy stemming from, and in some cases indirectly sanctioned by, high-level public persons in Nigeria
* The study was co-published by the MFA and UNODC and achieved significant international recognition and established Denmark, UNODC and Copenhagen University as relevant and thorough maritime security actors in West Africa. Having resulted in several relevant dialogues and bilateral discussions between Denmark and Nigeria, the study also informed parts of the activities in DMSP 3.
* The *Pirates of the Niger Delta* study was funded by unallocated funds, as initial DMSP 2-engagements highlighted the need for a greater and deeper understanding of West African piracy, which significantly differs from Somali-piracy on which several studies were conducted.

In January 2021, Denmark scaled up attention to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea even further by appointing a Special Representative on maritime security and committing an additional DKK 10 million ODA to a transition programme between DMSP 2 and 3. Implemented by UNODC starting in November 2021 and ending in December 2022, these additional funds are bridging DMSP 2 and 3 and supporting the establishment of regional Visit-Board-Search and Seizure Training Centres in Nigeria and Ghana within Zone E and F, respectively. VBSS centres are part of the Yaoundé Architecture on ensuring inter-agency and regional cooperation and training across countries in the respective zones. It is an essential part of the compliance to the Yaoundé Architecture to allow Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies, e.g., Customs, Police, Fisheries and Maritime Authorities, to conduct inter-agency and intra-country training and coordination law enforcement efforts in the maritime domain. (See also sections 4.2 and 4.3 below)

## Justification at programme level

As mentioned in section 2.1 and elaborated in Annex 1, a wide range of problems confront the Gulf of Guinea countries, with the Niger Delta of Nigeria as the epicentre of a regional piracy problem as stated. The Maritime Security Index[[12]](#footnote-13) generate scores for nine maritime issue areas that are presented in Annex 1. These include three threats to *security at sea*: piracy and armed robbery at sea, maritime mixed migration, and illicit trade; three measures of *economic resilience*: coastal welfare, fisheries, and the Blue Economy; and three contributors to *good governance*: the rule of law, international cooperation, and maritime enforcement capacity.[[13]](#footnote-14)

Risk factors are driving a vicious cycle: the weak rule of law and poor coastal welfare cause self-reinforcing negative dynamics in which neglect, corruption and coastal poverty cause a deepening political and economic disenfranchisement that enables a range of illicit maritime activities, including trafficking of drugs and weapons, IUU fishing and overfishing, irregular migration and human trafficking, and piracy, armed robbery and kidnapping for ransom. If left unaddressed, these illicit activities further weaken the rule of law and negatively impact coastal governance and communities.

Three main mitigating factors to break the vicious cycle are coordination between maritime law enforcement agencies, international, regional cooperation, and growing and sustaining a Blue Economy.

Figure 1 – Maritime insecurity and mitigation dynamics

Diagram

Description automatically generated

*Source:* (*Stable Seas and ICC, 2020)*

The programme’s overall justification lies in the pursuit of Danish interests and contribution in the interplay between security, political, development, and commercial dimensions of the challenges and opportunities in the Gulf of Guinea and the diplomatic engagements cutting across these spheres.

The Gulf of Guinea is essential to the economies of the countries bordering it and the 464 million people living in these countries. About 90 per cent of the region’s international trade is moving by sea. The offshore oil sector has an estimated 4.5 per cent of the world’s reserves that have only just started being developed, and fishery provides a livelihood for millions of people. The high rates of piracy and other maritime crime at sea in the region – particularly off the coast of Nigeria but expanding further at sea –place the lives of international seafarers at risk and threaten the further development of the blue economy. Therefore, improving maritime safety, including regional coordination, building national governance capabilities, and implementing strategies to enhance the sustainable protection and exploitation of the region’s blue economy are priorities.

The Priority Paper (see section 2.2.1) addresses Denmark’s overall response to these challenges with the central tenet that Denmark’s political, economic, and development interests in the region require a well-functioning and safe maritime domain. The Priority Paper cements Denmark’s whole-of-government approach and sets specific expectations to the PSF to deliver a response to the following Danish priorities in the Gulf of Guinea: (a) strengthening maritime governance in Nigeria and Ghana, including by assisting their legal frameworks and ability to investigate and prosecute maritime crime; (b) promoting regional cooperation and coordination; and (c) strengthening the ability of national and regional authorities to monitor the maritime domain and respond to emerging threats.

The DMSP 3 engagements – building on the results and lessons outlined in section 2.5 above –accordingly are focussed on the maritime security sector and the related criminal justice sector and on contributing to regional cooperation, and in the alignment of the ECJC approach of support to the sector practised by UNODC, INTERPOL and DCD. As a regional centre of excellence, KAIPTC engagement provides a regional policy platform of leverage.

As a bilateral stabilisation instrument, the PSF is one aspect of Denmark’s comprehensive response in the context of a whole-of-government approach. Other instruments include: (i) a military response through [the deployment of a Danish frigate](https://forsvaret.dk/en/news/2021/frigate-to-combat-piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/) for six months (from November 2021 to April 2022) to protect Danish and other merchant ships from pirates; (ii) a bilateral maritime engagement through [Maritime Strategic Sector Cooperation](https://www.dma.dk/Vaekst/Myndighedssamarbejder/Ghana/Sider/default.aspx) with Ghana as pursued by the Danish Maritime Authority, and (iii) diplomatic upscaling of Danish engagement includes the appointment of an [envoy on maritime security](https://www.danishshipping.dk/en/press/news/denmark-at-the-forefront-of-raising-security-in-the-gulf-of-guinea) and a Military Advisor to Ghana. Furthermore, through multilateral channels such as (iv) contributions to the World Bank and the EU development cooperation budget, Denmark contributes to addressing poverty and poor governance-related *root causes* of piracy on land.

As is elaborated in Chapter 4, justification of the DMSP 3 furthermore lies its *strategic fit* as a *stabilisation* programme focussed on risks of fragility and opportunities for strengthening resilience through effective rule of law in the maritime domain. As such, and as a crucial aspect of a whole-of-government approach, the DMSP 3 constitutes a prioritised Danish engagement that leverages a joined-up ODA and non-ODA response to counter threats to *security at sea*: piracy and armed robbery at sea, maritime mixed migration, and illicit trade; as a contribution to *economic resilience*: coastal welfare, fisheries, and the Blue Economy.

Compared to DMSP 2, DMSP 3 scales-up Danish engagement financially and covers five years of implementation and a significantly strengthened element of learning-for-adaptive management. The expanded geographically scope of DMSP 3 matches trends in piracy and other maritime crime that increasingly takes place further away from Nigeria’s Niger Delta – the hotbed of piracy in the region. Scaling up is viable through increased strategic alignment with UNODC that will manage and implement ODA and non-ODA funded activities, as well as contribute to strategic monitoring and donor coordination through a regional Monitoring Hub. The new partnership with INTERPOL (PSE 2) solidifies the Entire Criminal Justice Chain (ECJC) approach that constitutes the backbone of the programme: working towards effective maritime law enforcement starting with detection and interdiction on the sea; investigations based on properly secured evidence; prosecutions and detention following applicable rights standards and rehabilitation approaches. By assisting the region's countries to address the weak links in their national and regional criminal justice chains, the programme contributes to the regions efforts to address piracy and other maritime crime within the Yaoundé frameworks.

The partnerships with UNODC and INTERPOL furthermore will give the programme the expanded geographical footprint needed because these organisations have ongoing engagements in the four francophone countries to be included. Ghana and Nigeria are maintained as core countries. The programme expands to include Benin, Cameroon[[14]](#footnote-15), Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo by leveraging UNODC and INTERPOL ongoing engagements in those countries' maritime law and order sectors (Annex 2).

Regional and national cooperation spans across the full ECTC spectrum. At the ‘hard end’ military engagement (i.e., non-ODA under PSED 4) in maritime law enforcement is through training for Maritime Interception Operations that require regular navy and integrated military-civilian maritime law enforcement teams to be able to collaborate, including on handover suspects. Under PSE 1, UNODC will ensure stronger linkage between arrest and conviction. DMSP 3 incorporates training on policing skills and collaboration with INTERPOL’s existing regional presence. This includes evidence collection and capacity building to conduct on-sea and on-land maritime investigation into maritime crime networks and finance and related collusion and corruption. The engagement with KAIPTC leverages the regional role and convening power of this African peace keeping training center, that has a solid track record of conducting policy and practice related research and apply this knowledge to training development and convening policy fora. The aim is to foster stronger, more cohesive, and effective national and regional approaches to maritime security and an enhanced rate of implementation of the Yaoundé process. Synergies exist with the other engagements of the DMSP 3 and will be sought exploited in particular through joint training with UNODC on Women Peace and Security, and collaboration with UNODC, the Royal Danish Defence College and other relevant regional and international actors on thematic reports.

## ODA and non-ODA

Being PSF-funded, the programme draws from both ODA and non-ODA-eligible funding sources. During the formulation process, due attention has been paid to the latest guidance from [OECD/DAC](https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/oda-eligibility-database/)[[15]](#footnote-16) to ensure the programme’s compliance. It is noted that the DMSP 3 continues the practices that saw MFA funds on maritime security assessed as [ODA-eligible](https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/oda-eligibility-database/case-24.htm) in the OECD/DAC ODA Eligibility Database. This part of the programme’s budget furthermore is justified against the OECD/DAC quality criteria (Table 2). Specifically for PSE 2 implemented by INTERPOL, DAC-Abilityhas been double-checked. OECD guidance allows data collection for development purposes and preventative or investigatory activities by law enforcement agencies in the context of routine policing to uphold the rule of law, including countering transnational organised crime. Hostage debriefing is part of routine policing and in the case of the DMSP conducted in the context of upholding the rule of law in the maritime domain to counter transnational maritime crimes. In this case storage and use data gathered is permissible and DAC-able. What is explicitly excluded from ODA is intelligence gathering on political activities.[[16]](#footnote-17)

Programme design ensures strict adherence to the need for separation of ODA from MFA and non-ODA funds from the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The programme design achieves this by (i) organising non-ODA funded activities under the direct management of DCD (PSE 4 Maritime Domain Awareness and Operational Response) and separating non-ODA related VBSS training by UNODC in PSE 1 in a separate non-ODA financing agreement with a distinct set of activities, outcomes, outputs and monitoring and reporting procedures.

Table 2 – Justification against the OECD/DAC quality criteria

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **OECD-DAC** | **Assessment** |
| **Relevance** | The programme responds to critical shortcomings in the national and regional response to maritime crime as identified in UNSC resolutions and recent international meetings (such as the 2020 G7 FoGG++ and the 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference). It is fully aligned with key elements of ECOWAS integrated maritime strategy and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. It reflects national reform priorities, regarding more effective utilisation of maritime security capacities. In addition, the programme benefits from recent and on-going capacity development work undertaken by UNODC and INTERPOL. |
| **Effectiveness** | The effectiveness across the programme builds upon the previous work of UNODC, KAIPTC and Danish defence contributions (to the training of maritime response). While INTERPOL is a new partner, the organisation builds on 6 years of engagement in regional maritime policing supported by the US. Moreover, INTERPOL has an ongoing collaboration with UNODC on DMSP 2 activities, including participation in mock trials and VBSS training and exercises. Effectiveness will be enhanced by a flexible approach that responds to opportunities (as well as threats) and using clear milestones. KAIPTC regional convening and dialogue platform will enable the programme to gather key interlocutors together for consensus building. |
| **Efficiency** | The support will primarily be advisory, and training performed directly by INTERPOL, UNODC and Danish defence personnel. Where relevant, the capacities will be integrated into existing support arrangements that are already working. |
| **Impact** | The likelihood for impact is strengthened due to the economic interests in promoting a safe and secure maritime domain but may be uneven due to the political economy within the beneficiary countries, including Ghana and Nigeria, which remain the centre of gravity. The concerted bilingual training on VBSS at the Danish supported VBSS training locations in Nigeria and Ghana covers civilian maritime law enforcement agencies and to some extent navies from four additional countries (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, and Togo). It will increase the regional impact and impact on the operationalisation of the Yaoundé Architecture. |
| **Sustainability** | All outcome and output areas place significant emphasis on capacity development and efficient and effective utilisation of existing resources. The design is thus aimed at enhancing capacity without establishing unsustainable mechanisms. |

# Strategic framework and overall strategic objectives

## Programme Strategic Objective and Results Framework

The programme’s strategic objective is *enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national and regional level*.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Strategic Objective | | Enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national, zonal, and regional level. |
| Impact indicator | | Growth in use of multi-agency approaches to combat piracy and other types of maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea in relation to:  (a) Progress in development of regional framework in accordance with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct with contributions from national structures,  (b) Status of legal process to enable handover of suspects (where relevant), prosecution, conviction, and detention,  (c) Increase in number of successful integrated Visit-Board-Search and Seizures maritime interception missions. |
| Baseline | 2021 | 1. 1 MMCC fully operational (Cameroon Zone D), 2 MMCC partially operational (Benin Zone E, Ghana Zone F), 2 MMCC being established in Zones A and G. 2. No handover agreements in place. 3. Four (4) piracy-related cases admitted in case prosecutions (3 in Togo, 1 in Benin between 2015 - 2020). (PSED 2 Outcome 1 baseline). 4. 19 convictions for piracy following successful handover, of which 10 in Nigeria and nine (9) in Togo (PSED 1 Outcome 2). 5. WPS indicator PSED 3. |
| Target | 2026 | 1. *There is no direct activity towards operationalising MMCC, so it is an elliptical effect and measure of political will in the region/country. MA Abuja and Accra routinely follow these developments* 2. At least 5 Handover agreements (PSED 1- UNODC Output 3.1). 3. VBSS missions can measured numerically but engagement partners (PSE 1,2,) and DCD (PSE 4) need to agree on definition of ‘successes. (i.e., getting on board as planned in the MIO + securing evidence= success). Use PSED 2 Outcome 1 indicator. 4. At least 90 piracy suspects are prosecuted and detained in compliance with HR law (*pending inception report in 2022*) (PSED 1 Outcome 2). 5. WPS indicator PSED 3. |

## Theory of Change at programme level

The Theory of Change flows from the context analysis. It considers possibilities for Denmark to contribute to improved security conditions towards a situation in which shipping, seafarers, and other users of the maritime domain may freely and securely navigate the waters of the Gulf of Guinea being the programme’s ultimate aim. Achieving this end-state requires harmonising the Danish Maritime Security Programme with concerted efforts under way globally through the UN and an engaged US. In the European sphere, harmonisation and promoting Danish maritime security, stabilisation, development, and commercial interests involves the EU bodies and services, EU member states such as France, and European nations, such as the UK. There is common ground with the AU, its Regional Economic Communities (REC – i.e., ECOWAS and ECCAS), and alignment of efforts with the Gulf of Guinea countries to build out the Yaoundé architecture.

Table 3 – Theory of Change

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Outcome level** | *If* Denmark provides financial support to legal and strategic capacity building that enhances the effectiveness of efforts of Benin, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo to improve their maritime governance arrangements |
| ***And*** | |
|  | *if* Denmark supports building enhanced planning and response capacity that allows interregional, regional organizations and coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea to achieve timely and accurate decision-making that enables actions to neutralize threats in the maritime domain; |
| ***And*** | |
|  | *if* Denmark provides financial and technical expert support to (i) enhance regional dialogue on maritime security, (ii) improve maritime operational response capacities, (iii) strengthens the legal capacity to investigate and prosecute alleged criminal actors, and (iv) detain convicts of maritime crime |
| ***And*** | |
|  | *If Denmark* aligns its maritime security efforts with other international donors and regional and sub-regional strategies |
| ***Then*** | |
| **Outcome level** | Nigeria and Ghana and other beneficiary countries will have increased capacity to detect, share information and manage responses to threats towards shipping; a stronger basis to prosecute maritime crime; and interregional, regional organizations and coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea will have increased capacities, capabilities and frameworks feeding into operational and sustainable MDA and responses to emergencies/incidents; |
| ***Resulting in*** | |
| **Impact level** | *more timely and effective operational responses from Maritime Law Enforcement agencies in Nigeria and Ghana, and other countries in the region and the effective prosecution of persons engaged in or supporting maritime crime;* |
|  | *Eventually leading to a reduction in the number of attacks on international and local shipping and enhanced security, trade and contributions from the blue economy and ensuring the freedom of navigation* |
| ***Because*** | |
| **Assumptions** | * Stronger inter-agency cooperation mechanisms at the national and regional levels will help improve maritime law enforcement responses to maritime crime, including stronger judicial processes. * Maritime authorities in beneficiary countries are open to international assistance and are prepared to invest counterpart time and efforts in support arrangements, thereby ensuring productive use of the support offered. It is also assumed that UNODC and INTERPOL have sufficient local weight through their mandates to engage substantively with local authorities. * Suitable arrangements can be agreed with Nigeria and possibly Ghana as well as international partners (U.S, UK and possibly France), enabling Danish military capacities to be deployed in a training capacity. * UNODC provides effective harmonisation with other partners supporting the GMCP, including the EU (i.e., EU SVAIMS programme and related EU support to UNODC). * INTERPOL provides effective harmonisation and coordination with project AGWE/US INL. |
| ***And assuming the following preconditions apply*** | |
|  | * Countries and regional organisations have the political will to cooperate within the framework that is being established and are prepared to enter into legal and practical agreements with each other providing the basis for a cohesive regional approach. It is assumed, for example, that the structures under the Yaoundé architecture will be further developed and populated with regional and national staff and equipment in a manner that facilitates interoperability and timely response. * Countries recognise and develop effective national coordination mechanisms, including maritime strategies and inter-agency arrangements, and that they are open to international assistance in these endeavours. * Development deficiencies in coastal areas are addressed through inclusive national development strategies, and in particular in the Niger Delta. * Environmental degradation in the Niger Delta is reversed through concerted national actions supported by the oil industry. * Governments in the region address corruption and collusion and thereby address this enabling factor of piracy and other maritime crimes |

## Contextual risks

There is an overall need for concerted international, regional, and national efforts to counter piracy and robbery at sea. However, there are various contextual and programmatic risks. The contextual risks relates primarily to the weakness of the regional governance and normative framework provided by the Yaoundé Architecture. Although the Yaoundé Architecture is developing, contextual risks include the absence of cohesive strategic direction at the national level; shortcomings in maritime governance and legal due process; weaknesses in Maritime Domaine Awareness (MDA); the Maritime Situation Awareness (MSA); operational response and sustainable force generation (which is partially in place). These weaknesses, which the programme seeks to address, mean that there are also risks where results may be difficult to achieve, take longer time to implement than anticipated, or be unsustainable.

A second set of risks relates to human rights. On the one hand, the current absence of fit for purpose anti-piracy legislation in the majority of countries in West Africa raises the risk that alleged maritime criminals are prosecuted using inappropriate legal mechanisms, raising human rights concerns. The programme directly seeks to mitigate this through its support for maritime law enforcement based upon good international practice. UNODC’s success in Nigeria, where in July 2021 the death penalty was excluded from national piracy legislation (section 2.2.4), shows that Denmark also through its partners, in this case the UNODC, effectively can project influence on human rights standards. In addition, there is a safeguarding concern where Danish military experts have been involved in training Ghanaian and Nigerian navy counterparts; similar risks are associated with engaging maritime police forces and prisons. Therefore, all sponsored training will emphasise good human rights compliance to mitigate the risk of human rights abuses and the associated reputation risk for Denmark.

A third set of risks relates to the possibility that intended beneficiaries (regional and national maritime agencies) cannot interact effectively with the programme. This could be because of inadequate or conflicting policy direction leading to a weak ownership, lack of capacity and budgets, and competing interests between agencies. Annex 5 presents a detailed risk analysis.

## Danish strengths, interests, and opportunities

The nature of shipping is inherently global, and Denmark, therefore, has a strong interest in an open, free, and secure maritime domain with freedom of navigation for all vessels. Denmark’s strong position in global shipping also means that the lack of maritime security in some regions, resulting in piracy and other types of maritime crime, is a severe threat to both Danish seafarers, ship-owners, and Danish interests more generally. Piracy and other types of maritime crimes such as arms trafficking, drug smuggling and illegal fishing often arise from, and contribute to, regional instability. These crimes aggravate the situation for those living in the affected areas, the Blue Economies of states in the region, and those navigating the seas around them.

As a nation highly dependent on global maritime trade, Denmark has a significant interest in protecting the freedom of navigation and supporting maritime security. Denmark also has a special responsibility to protect Danish-owned ships and their seafarers. For these reasons, Denmark will continue to contribute to the international efforts in combating piracy and other types of maritime crimes. Denmark has significant political, security and economic interests in promoting a safer and more secure maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea region. The recent Danish priority paper on maritime security states that a favourable political, economic, and development trajectory is a clear Danish foreign policy objective. Danish shipping companies, port operators, and offshore supplies and services providers are directly affected by maritime insecurity, as the increasing Danish trade to West Africa depends on a secure, cost-effective maritime supply chain.

As already noted, at any one time, there are around 30-40 Danish operated vessels in the Gulf of Guinea, making up to 2,600 port calls a year. As part of its international support to West Africa, Denmark is an active contributor to the G7++FoGG. Building upon the Danish diplomatic and development presence in West Africa, the significant Danish shipping interests, and the platform provided by the present programme, DMSP 2, the MFA will maintain this policy and dialogue role in the years to come. As mentioned in section 2.5, Denmark comprehensively pursues its interests through a Whole of Government approach that combines multiple instruments in the diplomatic, development, commercial and military domains. Pursuing Danish interests in the region includes the appointment of an [envoy on maritime security](https://www.danishshipping.dk/en/press/news/denmark-at-the-forefront-of-raising-security-in-the-gulf-of-guinea), [the deployment of a Danish frigate](https://forsvaret.dk/en/news/2021/frigate-to-combat-piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/) for six months (from November 2021 to April 2022) to protect Danish and other merchant ships from pirates, and the [Maritime Strategic Sector Cooperation](https://www.dma.dk/Vaekst/Myndighedssamarbejder/Ghana/Sider/default.aspx) between Denmark and Ghana.

## Overall budget for the programme

The total budget is DKK 175 million and draws from ODA (DKK 80 million) and non-ODA (DKK 95 million) funding sources. The programme covers the period January 2022 to December 2026 (60 months). Commitments are made on a yearly basis through the Danish Finance Act and in accordance with the Danish Defence Agreement ending December 2023. Non-ODA funding includes DKK 35 million under the current Danish Defence Agreement and an estimated DKK 60 million pending a new Danish Defence Agreement from 2024 onwards. The funding will be allocated yearly in accordance with the yearly funding commitment system of the MFA and its MOD equivalent. The budget at the engagement level is shown in Table 4 below. A breakdown of the MOD/DCD budget is found in Annex 4.

Table 4 – Overall programme budget

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Current Defence Agreement* | | | | *New Defence Agreement* | | | | | | | |  | | |  | |
| **Engagement** | **2022** | | **2023** | | **2024** | | **2025** | | | **2026** | | | **Total** | | | **Grand**  **Total** | |
| **MFA** | **MOD** | **MFA** | **MOD** | **MFA** | **MOD** | **MFA** | **MOD** | **MFA** | | **MOD** | **MFA** | | **MOD** |  | |
| PSE 1 - UNODC (ODA) | 4.8 |  | 6.2 |  | 7.2 |  | 5.3 |  | 4.2 | |  | 27.7 | |  | 27.7 | |
| PSE 2 - INTERPOL | 3,5 |  | 7,7 |  | 5,1 |  | 5,3 |  | 3,4 | |  | 25 | |  | 25 | |
| PSE 3 - KAIPTC | 2.4 |  | 4.4 |  | 3.3 |  | 2.8 |  | 1.5 | |  | 14.4 | |  | 14.4 | |
| PSE 4 - DCD engagement |  | 12.3 |  | 14.6 |  | 14.1 |  | 14.6 |  | | 14.6 |  | | 70.2 | 70.2 | |
| PSE 4 - non-ODA funding for VBSS via UNODC/PSE1 |  | 2.5 |  | 5 |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  | | 7.5 | 7.5 | |
| PSE 4 - non-ODA funding for VBSS via UNODC/PSE1Pending new Defence agreement |  |  |  |  |  | 5 |  | 5 |  | | 5 |  | | 15 | **15** | |
| **Technical Assistance** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  | |  |  | |
| Maritime Security Program Advisor (MSPA) | 1.3 |  | 1.3 |  | 1.3 |  | 1.3 |  | 1.3 | |  | 6.5 | |  | 6.5 | |
| Monitoring, Evaluation Learning Coordinator (MEL) /1 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | | 0.2 | 1.5 | | 0.9 | 2.4 | |
| Civilian Maritime Advisor(CMA) /1 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | | 0.2 | 1.5 | | 0.9 | 2.4 | |
| Review /2 |  |  |  |  | 0.5 | 0.5 |  |  |  | |  | 0.5 | | 0.5 | 1 | |
| Unallocated |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  | 2.9 | |  | 2.9 | |
| **Annual Totals** | **12.6** | **15.0** | **20.2** | **20.0** | **18.0** | **20.0** | **15.3** | **20.0** | **11.1** | | **20.0** | **80** | | **95** | **175** | |

*/1 – Cost-sharing 65 percent MFA, 35 per cent MOD/DCD*

*/2 – Cost-sharing 65 percent MFA, 35 per cent MOD/DCD*

# Programme overview

Within the maritime threats and economic resilience framework presented in section 2.7, the stabilisation focussed DMSP 3’s entry point in the political economy complex of maritime crime and insecurity in the GoG is on piracy and other maritime crime response by national maritime law enforcement and regional cooperation on the same. As elaborated below, the strategic positioning and contribution of the DMSP 3 is on strengthening maritime law enforcement in close alignment with regional efforts under the Yaoundé Architecture.

## Entire Criminal Justice Chain approach

The programme underlying intervention logic applies the Entire Criminal Justice Chain (ECJC) approach of the UNODC Global Maritime Security Programme that builds on regional cooperation to focus on maritime law enforcement, detection/interdiction, investigations, prosecution, and detention.

Table 5 – DMSP 3 engagements and the Entire Criminal Justice Chain approach to piracy and other maritime crimes

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Diagram  Description automatically generated with medium confidence  *Source: UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme* | |
| **Engagement** | **Placement on the Entire Criminal Justice Chain (ECTC) spectrum** |
| **Engagement 1 – UNODC: Regional support to criminal justice system responses to the threat of maritime crime**  (Benin, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo) | *Regional and national cooperation spans across the full ECTC spectrum, starting with providing ODA and non-ODA training in VBSS that is crucial to integrated security-to-justice law and order sector responses, including investigation, prosecution, and detention. Works on handover agreements.* |
| **Engagement 2 – INTERPOL: Maritime policing, investigation, and evidence collection**  (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo) | *Focussed on policing skills and collaborations. Engages in VBSS with a focus on evidence collection and investigations, including off and on land maritime crime networks and finance.*  *Supports development of handover agreements.* |
| **Engagement 3 – KAIPTC: Integrated Responses to Threats to Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Domain** | *Has a focus on training, regional cooperation, policy implementation and influencing through evidence-based knowledge products across the ECTC chain Promotion of media professionalism and civil society in maritime crime reporting and prevention.* |
| **Engagement 4 – DCD: Maritime Domain Awareness and Operational Response**  (Ghana and Nigeria, with UNODC training including Benin, , Cote d’Ivoire, and Togo) | *Military (i.e., non-ODA) engagement in maritime law enforcement through training for Maritime Interception Operations and related VBSS scenarios requiring regular navy and integrated military-civilian maritime law enforcement teams.* |

## Visit, board, search, and seizure

**Visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) form a core part of the second (detection/ interdiction) and third elements (investigation) of the justice chain in the maritime sector.** Law enforcement agencies (both civilian and military) use the term to describe maritime boarding actions and tactics. Strengthened VBSS capacity in the maritime domain is essential to deal with risks linked to activities taking place at sea, e.g., transport, tourism, fisheries, aquaculture, oil, and gas production. The range of risks include accidents, pollution, illegal fishing, illegal migration, terrorism, ecological disasters, piracy, armed robbery etc.

Every coastal country has military and civil authorities that perform different tasks to monitor, survey and control maritime activities and risks. These tasks are referred to as Coast Guard Functions and range from maritime security and maritime safety, including vessel traffic management and port security to maritime customs activities, border control, search and rescue, fishery inspection and maritime environmental protection and response, among others. To enforce a coast guard function, an authority needs to have the jurisdiction in the area delegated by the right authority, which is normally the Ministry of Justice.

Therefore, a range of authorities in coastal states (customs, immigration, police, harbour authorities, marine police, health inspectors, environmental protection authorities, maritime authorities, coast guard and navy etc.) will have assigned jurisdiction of a coast guard function and hence be responsible for having the capacity and capability to enforce and respond accordingly. When coast guard functions are enforced at sea, there is a need for authorities to be able to conduct VBSS.

Some countries only have a navy to enforce coast guard functions at sea. Therefore, the navy is tasked with the responsibility of coast guard functions and more traditional naval tasks such as protecting a country’s territorial waters and its EEZ (sovereignty). In the Gulf of Guinea, most of the coastal states only have a navy, except for a few like Capo Verde that only has a coast guard.

With the functions divided over a range of agencies, it is often necessary to do joint enforcement in a given situation. This could be in a situation where authorities are conducting an inspection of seaworthiness of a ship, or a ship has an accident at sea where there is the need for assistance and inspection by personnel from the health agency, marine police, and immigration (if the person must be taken ashore). Additionally, in many countries, especially in the Gulf of Guinea, many of the agencies in question do not have all the required assets in house, such as means of transportation at sea (ships, small boats, RIP etc.). Therefore, they must seek assistance from the coast guard or the navy to provide transportation, and the enforcement becomes a joint VBSS operation.

Importantly, the above situations have two common characteristics. Firstly, that the different agencies’ VBSS teams are trained *individually* to carry out duties in their assigned areas of jurisdiction. Secondly, the agencies are also trained in a *variety of mixed constellations* in joint operations to be able to enforce one or several functions in a given situation. A situation may be *compliant* (vessels comply with the direction of the boarding team), *non-compliant* (vessels are non-cooperative with the boarding team) or *opposed* (vessel actively or passively denies the board team access). See table 6 below for an overview of the different types of VBSS missions versus risk levels.

Table 6 – VBSS typology and ODA eligibility

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | **A** | **B** | **C** |
|  |  |  | **MIL** | **MIL\_CIV** | **CIV** |
| I | Non-Compliant | **Opposed Boarding** | Bilateral US  Non-ODA | Non-ODA | ODA |
| **Non-cooperative Boarding** | Interpol (ODA)  Non-ODA | Non-ODA | ODA |
| II | Compliant | **Unopposed Boarding** | Interpol (ODA)  Non-ODA | Non-ODA/ODA (INTERPOL) | ODA  (INTERPOL) |
| **Consensual Visit** | Interpol (ODA)  Non-ODA | Non-ODA/ODA (INTERPOL) | ODA  (INTERPOL) |
| III | Compliant/ Non-Compliant | **Right of Approach and Visit** | Interpol (ODA)  Non-ODA | Non-ODA/ODA (INTERPOL) | ODA |

## Synergies between engagements

At programme-level coordination and synergies between the engagement implementers will be through the Cross-Engagement Coordination Committee CECC) that meets twice yearly in meetings called by the RDE Accra through the MSPA

The main synergies between the four PSE 4 engagements exist around VBSS (that involves PSE 1, 2 and 4), and WPS are summarised in Table 7.

Table 7 – Overview of synergies between engagements

|  |
| --- |
| **PSE 1 – UNODC: Regional support to criminal justice system responses to the threat of maritime crime** |
| UNODC’s regional and national cooperation spans the entire ECJC spectrum, starting with providing ODA and **non-ODA training (PSE 4) in VBSS**, which is crucial to integrated security-to-justice law and order sector responses, and including **investigation (PSE 2)**, prosecution, and detention. Synergies with PSE 2 build on a well-established prior relationship and include **handover agreements** that are crucial to effective regional criminal justice. As part of PSE 1, UNODC provides technical assistance in *drafting and agreeing on* handover agreements; as part of PSE 2, INTERPOL trains MLE actors *using* the handover agreements. The UNODC **Monitoring Hub** will draw on information from PSE 2, PSE 3 and PSE 4. Furthermore, the inception phase on and assessment on prison facilities in Togo and Nigeria have synergies to both PSE 2 on maritime policing, investigation, and evidence collection, which might led to prosecution and potential imprisonment. This is also the case for PSE 4 on operational response and training of MLE teams.  Other synergies: see PSE 3 on WPS research, training and Flagship Report. |
| **PSE 2 – INTERPOL: Maritime policing, investigation, and evidence collection** |
| The engagement with INTERPOL (PSE 2) focuses on policing skills and regional collaborations. Operationally, INTERPOL’s ODA compliant engagement in **VBSS (PSE 1)** focuses on maritime law enforcement (**MLE) in evidence collection and investigations**, including off and on land maritime crime networks and finance. Under the AGWE project, INTERPOL has a range of existing MLE collaborations in the DMPS 3 beneficiary countries and information. PSE 2 will contribute to the **Monitoring Hub’s MLE country profiles**.  Other synergies: see participation in OBANGAME EXPRESS (PSE 4), Operational WPS in MLE standard operating procedures with PSE 1. This includes synergies to potential engagement on prisons (pending inception phase). |
| **PSE 3 – KAIPTC: Integrated Responses to Threats to Maritime Safety and Security in the GoG Maritime Domain** |
| Synergies with **PSE 1** include furthering the **WPS agenda through joint WPS research and training curriculum development**. KAIPTC and UNODC will collaborate on a WPS course that will benefit from the development by KAIPTC of a Code of Maritime Practice for Women in the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Domain. The two organisations’ contributions to the WPS course (expected to be hosted by KAIPTC) will match their respective organisations’ strengths. KAIPTC will contribute a combination of grounded and policy-oriented research and access to (female) regional decision-makers. UNODC will contribute technical gender and WPS expertise flowing from its maritime security involvements in the region and international best practices in its global maritime security programme. Furthermore, collaboration with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women). The Civilian Maritime Advisor based in Abuja support the WPS strands of work with UNODC and KAIPTC.  As part of PSE 4, the Royal Danish Defence College will station a **temporary RDDC expert at KAIPTC** to develop a series of seminars and conferences focussed on maritime industries and maritime authorities. Collaboration on policy driven thematic research is foreseen.  Other synergies: INTERPOL regularly contributes to KAIPTC’s foundational course on maritime security, which in return contributes to the development of a regional and shared understanding of security culture. |
| **PSE 4 – DCD Maritime Domain Awareness and Operational Response** |
| The Danish Defence – i.e., non-ODA– engagement (PSE 4), includes Danish participation in **OBANGAME EXPRESS**. Broader synergies with **UNODC and INTERPOL** jointly support training exercises involving all justice chain actors (funded by other donors) and support **simulated trials as a follow-up to OBANGAME EXPRESS maritime exercises**  Operational synergies between PSE 1 and PSE 4 are evident in the non-ODA funded **training provided by UNODC for Maritime Interception Operations and related VBSS scenario**s requiring regular navy and integrated military-civilian maritime law enforcement teams. This includes synergies to potential engagement on prisons (pending inception phase).  Other synergies: see PSE 3 on RDDC collaboration and Flagship Reports. WPS incorporated in PSE 1 non-ODA training of navy personnel from Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo funded under PSE 4. DCD will continue to promote and encourage the full participation of women serving in national navies to participate in its activities. |

## Engagement 1 – UNODC: Regional support to criminal justice system responses to the threat of maritime crime

### PSE 1 – Overview

PSE 1 will support maritime law enforcement and prosecution in Benin, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo, including mainstream and specific gender and Women Peace and Security (WPS) activities. This peace and stabilisation engagement will strengthen the development of sustainable and cohesive institutional arrangements for maritime security by enhancing the strategic basis for decision-making and the practical interaction between relevant actors, including the national maritime authorities, navies, and the maritime police. This will include reinforcing the rule of law by conducting capacity building for prosecutors and justice actors and prison services, with a particular focus on the WPS agenda measures as applicable to maritime security and maritime law enforcement.

The focus of activities will primarily be on reinforcing the entire chain of the justice system in the target countries when it comes to maritime crimes by supporting the signature of handover agreements. Furthermore, PSE 1 will further strengthen the VBSS centres, established in the Danish funded 2021-2022-bridging engagement, and ensure the regional capacity to prosecute and support for the establishment of human rights compliant prisons that are rehabilitation centred.

Finally, the engagement will promote gender mainstreaming through the maritime security sector in the GoG.

Table 8 – Overview of PSE 1 results areas

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Engagement Objective | The criminal justice systems in Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo are responding to the threat of maritime crime. |
| Outcome 1 | Civilian maritime law enforcement agency personnel from Zone E (Togo, Benin, Nigeria), Zone D (Cameroon), and Zone F (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana) can detect, interdict, arrest and seize in the maritime domain, enhancing coordination between UNODC and INTERPOL |
| Outcome 2 | Efficient prosecution of maritime crime suspects in target countries and human rights compliant detention facilities for maritime crimes in Togo and or Nigeria. |
| Outcome 3 | Gender roles and implementation of UNSCR 1325/Women Peace and Security in relation to maritime crimes in the GoG are better addressed through research-based training of Navy and MLE personnel as well as maritime policy and decision makers provided by UNODC and KAIPTC |
| Outcome 4 | ECJC/MLE baseline profiles of Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo. ECJC virtual donor technical group (VDTG) meetings twice yearly and UNODC tracks key regional and national indicators to inform VDTG members. |
| Outcome 5  (non-ODA) | Navy personnel from Zone E (Togo, Benin, Nigeria), Zone D (Cameroon) and Zone F (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana) are trained to conduct military and integrated Maritime Interception Operations (*Implemented by UNODC under separate agreement with MOD/DCD see section 4.7)* |

1 – ODA VBSS: MLE in target countries can detect, interdict, arrest and seize in the maritime domain

This set of engagement activities aim to build sustainable expertise in each country regarding VBSS operations at sea pertaining to the interdiction of vessels involved in suspected maritime crime cases. By addressing impunity at for crimes at sea and demonstrating authority in national waters VBSS combined with regular presence in the maritime domain also can have preventive effects.

Partnering with European Maritime Safety Agency [(EMSA)](http://www.emsa.europa.eu/publications/item/3983-copernicus-infosheet-support-to-international-organisations-nemo-operations-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-west-africa.html), the [EU GoGIN Project The YARIS platform](https://www.gogin.eu/en/information-sharing/yaris-yaounde-architecture-regional-information-sharing/), and NGOs, UNODC will bring together international partners in the region that support and provide maritime domain focused data and analysis to increase MDA and response. Related to VBSS handover of arrested maritime crime suspects to civilian maritime law enforcement agencies remains a key issue in the Gulf of Guinea. Training provided under PSE 1 complements UNODC’s work of the model Handover Agreement for the transfer of evidence and of suspects involved in piracy and other maritime crimes in Zone E of the Yaoundé Architecture. A UNODC prepared draft agreement has received the support of ECOWAS.[[17]](#footnote-18) The VBSS training component builds on existing experience from the UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) in Sri Lanka as well as the establishment of training centres in Nigeria (Zone E) and Ghana (Zone F) as part of the Danish funded 2021-2022 VBSS bridging project. Upon accomplishing the bridging project, a completion report in early 2023 will identify innovation, synergies and potential gaps before further ODA funded engagement. Synergies already include incorporating DMSP 3 of regional policing focussed VBSS (see PSE 2).

Key outputs include:

* Maritime law enforcement in beneficiary countries routinely use Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) tools to plan maritime interception operations;
* VBSS training centres established in Ghana and Nigeria used to deliver training in French and English to beneficiary countries MLE agencies’ personnel through 19 civilian VBSS training courses for 376 MLE participants, of which 16 participants achieved Certified National instructor level to build regional training capacity.

2 – Efficient prosecution of maritime crime cases and human rights compliant detention facilities

Efficient and rights compliance includes measures supporting national GoG authorities in implementing hand-over agreements with international navies and involves raising awareness on the necessity to sign handover agreements with international non-coastal States (Italy, Denmark and potentially other international partners operating in the GoG) for the transfer of evidence and suspects involved in piracy and other maritime crimes. Formal and standard-setting handover agreements must govern piracy and other maritime crime suspects handing over. Due diligence and human rights risk management require that potential convicts be held in prisons up to human rights standards. MSP III interventions in this area will be determined during the first 12 months of the programme. During this inception phase the UNODC GMCP will conduct an initial prison assessment in Togo and Nigeria and engage in political dialogue with relevant international partners in order to broaden political and financial support for ameliorating standards ofprison facilities serving the maritime criminal justice chain in Nigeria and/or Togo. Possible changes to PSE I activities following the completion of the inception phase will be presented to the PSF Steering Committee for approval.

The UNODC GMCP has extensive experience in prison building and refurbishing, which started in Somalia under the UNODC counter-piracy project in that country. A training curriculum for correctional officers (prison guards) will be developed with English and French versions in training.

Key outputs include:

* At least five (5) handovers implemented agreements finalized and implemented between Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo.
* Refurbished international standard prison wings in Nigeria and/or Togo that can hold up to 70 convicts including training of prison guards on vocational training programmes.   
  *(pending inception phase)*

3 – Gender roles and actions on WPS priorities

The WPS agenda historically has been concerned with on-land related issues and the WPS agenda in the maritime domain is underdeveloped. Against this background, the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy under its Strategic Objective Five: Promote Maritime Awareness and Research calls on its Member States to “enhance advocacy and awareness to ensure gender mainstreaming in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1325.” (ECOWAS, 2015, p. 49). UNODC will link the results of its ongoing multi-country study on gender and the maritime domain and collaborate with the KAIPTC Women Peace & Security Institute ([WPSI](https://wpsi.kaiptc.org/))[[18]](#footnote-19) to develop an annual training to mainstream gender in maritime law enforcement and security. WPSI has developed a set of WPS activities to underpin this collaboration (see PSE 3). UNODC will seek partnership with UN Women as the specialised UN agency on WPS. UNODC and KAIPTC bring complementary capabilities to the WPS agenda. KAIPTC will leverage it training platform and network, while UNODC will trailer WPS training to the target groups participating in VBSS training. Key outputs include:

* Maritime WPS training course established manual materials in French and English, collaboration, collaboration with KAIPTC and UN Women and at least 48 MLE identified by UNODC personnel trained (additional trainees identified by KAIPTC, see PSED 3)

4 – ECJC monitoring and donor technical group

As implementing partner of choice in the ECJC sector for several development partners (EU, US, NO, and DK) in a range of countries besides the six beneficiary countries, including Gabon, Cape Verde, and others, UNODC will convene a virtual donor technical group every six months. In collaboration with INTERPOL and drawing on the MMA Abuja’s operational knowledge, UNODC will prepare MLE country profiles ‘two pagers’ presenting an overview of MLE institutions, key government initiatives concerning the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct activities, and support to those institutions and activities. The virtual donor technical working groups will constitute the basis for a monitoring hub to be established by UNODC and aimed at enhancing effectivity and sustainability of the action conducted in the PSED beneficiary countries, extended to all countries in which UNODC implements and plans to implement programming in support of the criminal justice system at national and regional level in the Gulf of Guinea. The monitoring hub will provide donors and implementing partners with a monitoring matrix including a set of indicators and piracy data to reflect results versus factual analysis, including identification of gaps and needs to would be addressed by the donor community and implementing partners in a coordinated matter aiming at a strengthened criminal justice chain. Beyond coordination of existing initiatives conducted by UNODC and implementing partners, the monitoring hub will also serve as a reference for future actions to be developed. A dedicated support to the monitoring hub will be provided through a senior advisory role to be established by UNODC.

5 – (**Non-ODA VBSS**) Navy personnel from Benin, Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Togo trained to conduct military and integrated Maritime Interception Operation (MIO).

A Danish non-ODA funded VBSS training and VBSS Instructor certification track that will build regional capacity in the navies of the beneficiary countries. The Danish support will be the first-time personnel from these regional navies will be offered in-service training trajectories to develop progressive VBSS skills up to VBSS Instructor level. UNODC will conduct a VBSS Training Scoping Assessment covering Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo, and use permanent VBSS training centres in Nigeria and Ghana established with ODA compatible Danish bridging funding implemented by UNODC in 2021-2022. Non-ODA funded VBSS training will be provided relevant in various compliant/non-compliant and opposed/unopposed scenarios for military and integrated Maritime Interception Operations. Navy personnel from Zone E (Togo, Benin, Nigeria), Zone D (Cameroon) and Zone F (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana) will be trained.

* VBSS Training Scoping Assessment report covering Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo)
* Cadre of navy personnel from Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo trained in VBSS through 20 military VBSS training for 400 participants of which 16 participants (4 %) achieve Certified National Instructor level

### PSE 1 – Choice of partner

UNODC is the UN’s specialised agency dealing with maritime crime, drug-related crime, criminal justice reform, organized crime and terrorism, corruption, and economic crime. The engagement will take the form of an earmarked contribution to the UNODC’s Global Maritime Crime Programme, which has been supporting maritime legal development in the Gulf of Guinea since 2015. In general, the GMCP supports member states in responding to maritime challenges and fostering international cooperation among states in tackling transnational crimes. Cooperation with INTERPOL is well established, also through the joint support to simulated trials as a follow up to OBANGAME EXPRESS maritime exercises. UNODC and INTERPOL jointly work in a training exercise involving all actors of the justice chain, starting from the maritime component of the capacity building activity conducted on vessels involved in the US led OBANGAME EXPRESS exercise, then to the land component with evidence management and hand over to prosecutors, then training and mentoring of those same prosecutors for trial using the simulated evidence collected and cross examining the same maritime law enforcement officers.

UNODC is a known and trusted partner that Denmark has ongoing cooperation with on maritime crime and security in the Gulf of Guinea under DMSP 2 and the Horn of Africa. UNODC is an important institution in relation to legal reforms in various areas and is currently providing support to Ghana and Nigeria through embedded advisors as part of the DMSP 2. Denmark has partnered with UNODC in multiple contexts, including counterterrorism. It has a proven ability to deliver under challenging conditions and contexts. UNODC has a track record in areas with weak or complicated bureaucracies and has demonstrated the capacity to ensure monitoring and risk management.

UNODC is implementing a separate MFA/ODA bridging project in 2021-2022 to scale up regional VBSS training capacity. The PSF reserve funds this bridging project. Results include establishing permanent VBSS training centres in Nigeria and Ghana, Zone E and F, respectively. The establishment of these permanent VBSS centres and the capability to provide courses in French and English fulfil a critical need for permanent and adequately equipped zonal infrastructure to train maritime law enforcement agencies. The results of the VBSS bridging project provides the basis for the DMSP 3 to – in addition to Ghana and Nigeria – expand its regional reach and include training of civilian maritime law enforcement personnel from agencies in Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo (all Francophone countries).

### PSE 1 – Management and monitoring

UNODC GMCP will implement the engagement. The UNODC GMCP falls under the Justice Section and the Division for Operations of UNODC and is the only global programme in the UNODC, managed in the field, and its headquarters is currently in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The activities in this project engagement will be under the management and responsibility of the Atlantic Ocean team of the UNODC GMCP based in Libreville, Gabon. The Atlantic Office programme manager in Gabon will supervise, guide, and manage the project officers, who will oversee the project implementation and coordination based in Accra, Ghana. GMCP has a Management and Analysis team based at UNODC headquarters in Vienna, supporting GMCP implementation with financial and administrative monitoring and reporting. UNODC will participate in the Cross-Engagement Coordination Committee (CECC) that meets twice yearly in meetings called by the Embassy in Accra through the Maritime Security Programme Advisor (MSPA) as detailed in section 5.1.

### PSE 1 – Engagement budget (ODA)[[19]](#footnote-20)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Output** | **2022** | **2023** | **2024** | **2025** | **2026** | **Total (DKK)** | **Total (USD)** |
| Output 1.1 | 0.1 |  |  |  |  | 0.1 | 0.02 |
| Output 1.2 |  | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 7.6 | 1.20 |
| Output 2.1 | 1.4 |  |  |  |  | 1.4 | 0.23 |
| Output 2.2 | 0.04 |  |  |  |  | 0.04 | 0.01 |
| Output 2.3 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 1.6 |  |  | 4.2 | 0.66 |
| Output 2.4 |  | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.9 |  | 2.5 | 0.39 |
| Output 3.1 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.1 |  |  | 0.8 | 0.13 |
| Output 3.2 |  | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 0.23 |
| Output 4.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.93 |
| Personnel | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 5.8 | 0.93 |
| Total Activities | *4.3* | *5.5* | *6.4* | *4.7* | *3.7* | *24.7* | *3.90* |
| Indirect Cost (13%) | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 3.2 | 0.51 |
| **TOTAL** | **4.8** | **6.2** | **7.2** | **5.3** | **4.2** | **27.7** | **4.40** |

*Exchange rate 1 USD = 6.3 DKK. Amounts in DKK are governing.*

### PSE 1 – Results framework

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Project objective** | | The criminal justice systems in Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo are responding to the threat of maritime crime. | |
| Impact indicator | | Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo can apply inter-agency approaches to maritime crime, while confidently handing over suspects with the ability to incarcerate the accused in accordance with Human Rights principles.  Ratio of cases handed over and ratio of personnel in the entire justice chain increase year over year. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | Little or no legal finish for maritime crimes. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | Ratio between arrest and legal finish with HR compliant detention in all targeted countries for maritime crimes is increased. |
| **Outcome 1** | | Civilian maritime law enforcement agency personnel from Zone E (Togo, Benin, Nigeria), Zone D (Cameroon) and Zone F (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana) can detect, interdict, arrest and seize in the maritime domain, enhancing coordination between UNODC and INTERPOL. | |
| Outcome indicator | | Year over year, civilian maritime law enforcers from beneficiary countries are conducting more frequent VBSS by using MDA. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | No frequent use of MDA technology and lack of VBSS capacities. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | Law enforcement personnel from target countries have increased VBSS capabilities applying MDA techniques in maritime interception operations. |
| **Outcome 2** | | Efficient prosecution of maritime crime suspects in target countries and human rights compliant detention facilities for maritime crimes in Togo or Nigeria. | |
| Outcome indicator | | Ratio of suspects convicted in piracy and other maritime crime have increased in the (specified countries), while a dedicated wing for piracy and maritime crime convicts is operational in Togo/Nigeria *(pending inception report in 2022)*. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | 19 convictions for piracy following successful hand over, of which 10 in Nigeria and 9 in Togo. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | At least 90 piracy suspects are prosecuted and detained in compliance with HR law *(pending inception report in 2022)* |
| **Outcome 3** | | Gender roles and implementation of UNSCR 1325/Women Peace and Security in relation to maritime crimes in the GoG are better addressed through research-based training of Navy and MLE personnel and maritime policy and decision makers provided by UNODC and KAIPTC. | |
| Outcome indicator 3.1 | | At minimum one (1) training is developed every year starting in 2023 to mainstream gender in maritime law enforcement, with standard procedures developed for Women, Peace and Security in the maritime sector. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | No training targeted to gender mainstreaming in MLE  No WPS procedures. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | Four (4) training courses total realised in collaboration with KAIPTC  WPS procedures developed. |
| **Outcome 4** | | UNODC Maritime Security Monitoring Hub tracks key maritime security trends and MLE engagement and improves donor coordination. | |
| Outcome indicator 4.1 | | Well-informed donors provide aligned and coordinated supported to ECJC related to maritime security and continued demand for UNODC monitoring hub is expressed in donor support beyond 2026 | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | No Monitoring Hub, no regular VDTG meeting or briefings. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | UNODC Maritime Security Monitoring Hub functioning and at least three (3) years of continued operating costs secured. |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Non-ODA finance by MoD/part of PSED 4 budget** | | | |
| **Outcome 5** | | Navy personnel from Zone E (Togo, Benin, Nigeria), Zone D (Cameroon) and Zone F (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana) can detect, interdict, arrest, seize and hand over in the maritime domain, enhancing coordination between UNODC, INTERPOL and Defence Command Denmark. | |
|  | | Number of individuals suspected of piracy and other maritime crimes brought to court with an effective hand over. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | 19 convictions for piracy following successful hand over, of which 10 in Nigeria and 9 in Togo. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | Year on year increase in handover of suspects for piracy and maritime crimes to the justice systems. |

## Engagement 2 – INTERPOL: Maritime policing, investigation, and evidence collection

### PSE 2 – Overview

INTERPOL’s experience of implementing projects in the GoG since 2015 shows that a successful strategy to enhance maritime security in the GoG necessarily promotes stronger cooperation at the national, regional, and international levels. PSE 2 aims to reinforce and deepen law enforcement outcomes in the GoG by developing existing capacities and addressing identified gaps through capacity building, hands-on mentorship, analytical support and operational activities in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo.[[20]](#footnote-21) In these five countries, INTERPOL is currently implementing the fourth generation of the US Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) supported [Project AGWE](https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Maritime-crime/Project-AGWE-West-Africa) that has been supporting the improvement of laws dealing with maritime crime.

While taking place at sea these perils do not occur in isolation from complex land-based issues stemming from insufficient governance capacity, economic mismanagement, and weak coordination at the local, national, and international levels. Intelligence on maritime crime in the GoG indicates that criminal networks of varying levels of sophistication carry out most serious incidents, such as the kidnapping of seafarers for ransom, as well as illegal oil bunkering and trafficking of licit and illicit goods via the maritime domain. As such, the perpetrators at sea are only a small part of the wider network, which include land-based infrastructure, support personnel and high-level leaders/organisers, who typically do not get involved in operations at sea.

The intervention’s approach will focus on improving beneficiary units’ abilities to manage a crime scene and debrief hostages and strengthen security measures at key port facilities. The broader aim is deepening criminal investigations. PSE 2 will take advantage of ongoing engagements with beneficiary law enforcement agencies and utilising the existing Regional Network of Experts drawn from these units in the framework of Project AGWE. Furthermore, it will focus on four inter-related activity areas: (i) hands-on mentorship and analytical support; (ii) capacity building focusing on crime scene preservation for VBSS teams within beneficiary countries’ national MLE agencies (iii) hostage debriefing initiative; and (iv) Port security training and operational exercises on the physical security of strategic port infrastructure.

Table 9 – Overview of PSE 2 results areas

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Engagement Objective | Beneficiary countries are tackling maritime-based crime more effectively through deeper investigations into the wider organisational structures of organised criminal groups and reinforced security at port facilities. |
| Outcome 1 | Maritime law enforcement improves by strengthening beneficiary units’ crime scene management skills and ability to debrief former hostages. |
| Outcome 2 | Improved safety and security in the GoG through stronger security measures at key port facilities and enhanced law enforcement skills to prevent, detect, investigate, and respond to threats to port security. |

1– Hands-on mentorship and analytical support

Beneficiary countries need to expand investigations and prosecutions to encompass the front-line perpetrators attacking vessels at sea and the organizers on land. INTERPOL will assist by 1) hands-on mentorship; 2) support to beneficiary countries to improve their evidence gathering (i.e., crime scene management and hostage debriefing); 3) enhancing security at ports; 4) INTERPOL Global Maritime Security Database (GMSD) crosschecks and analytical support[[21]](#footnote-22); 5) building coalitions between affected countries to improve information sharing.

2 – Capacity building focusing on crime scene preservation for VBSS

First responders across the region need to become better at preserving and adequately managing crime scenes on board a victim vessel. As part of DMSP 3, VBSS training will be provided, geared towards equipping national MLE agencies’ VBSS teams with the required skillset and practice – in line with applicable standard operating procedures – to preserve a crime scene and cooperate with other national security and justice sector agencies responsible for combatting crime in the maritime domain. VBSS training by INTERPOL will be harmonised with Danish supported VBSS centres through UNODC in Ghana and Nigeria, covering Zones E and F, respectively. In this framework, some of the crime scene management and preservation training sessions can be delivered on board a simulated vessel provided by the UNODC. These sessions at the VBSS training centres will complement live exercise activities under Project AGWE in cooperation with forthcoming OBANGAME EXPRESS exercises.

3 – Hostage debriefing initiative

The rationale for a hostage debriefing initiative will be to enhance beneficiary countries’ ability to debrief released hostages and subsequently share this information with INTERPOL and other stakeholder countries if required. The debriefings can also be coordinated by INTERPOL Maritime Security Sub-directorate (MTS) with the support of the mentors and experts from INTERPOL member countries (i.e., Denmark, U.S., etc.). The delivery modality consists of two components: 1) Locating hostages (and establishing willingness to be debriefed) and 2) training officers to improve their interviewing skills.

The information obtained from the debriefings will be shared with INTERPOL and processed through the INTERPOL Global Maritime Security Database (GMSD) with the support of an analyst based in Lyon. Where relevant, operational analysis reports will be produced to support ongoing investigations by any country where possible (i.e., not restricted to the five beneficiary countries). This will facilitate identifying potentially new links between incidents and / or subjects that can advance investigations or support a prosecution.

4 – Port security training and operational exercises on the physical security of strategic port infrastructure

INTERPOL MTS is currently implementing the EU-funded Port Security Project (PSP) in East Africa (encompassing nine littoral countries) and will utilise good practices from that domain in the GoG context. Applicable activities already in the delivery process by PSP in East Africa (i.e., e-learning modules, physical training curricula) will be adopted and delivered under PSE 2, thereby boosting efficiency. Targeted training courses will be developed to build the capacity of national representatives from Port Authorities, Customs and Immigration, Coast Guard, Police, Prosecution Service, and all other pertinent law enforcement agencies within each beneficiary country and develop standard operating procedures (SOP) at a national and regional level. The judiciary will be involved in some of the training when possible and in coordination with UNODC.

### PSE 2 – Choice of partner

As the world’s largest international law enforcement organization, INTERPOL has been a key enabler of international cooperation in the fight against maritime-based crime in the GoG, in support of UN Security Council Resolution 2039 (2012).[[22]](#footnote-23) INTERPOL has 194 member countries and a strong presence in the GoG region through its National Central Bureaus (NCBs) network and its two Regional Bureaus (RBs) located in Yaoundé, Cameroon and Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. Following its mandate, INTERPOL has been actively supporting affected member countries in their investigations by deploying Incident Response Teams (IRTs), enhancing investigative capacities through training, and providing analytical support via its analytical team, using INTERPOL policing capabilities that comprise multiple databases, including the GMSD. INTERPOL provides targeted training, expert investigative support, relevant data, and secure communications channels to its member countries as part of its mission. The Organization promotes preventing and fighting crime through enhanced international law enforcement cooperation and innovation on police and security matters. INTERPOL is currently delivering Project AGWE IV that enhances maritime law enforcement capabilities in five countries in the Gulf of Guinea – Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo – by linking first responders, investigators, and prosecutors, and increasing cross-border collaboration. Under AGWE, a Regional Network of Experts has formed. AGWE include joint INTERPOL activity (mock trials) with UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme (see section 4.4.2).

### PSE 2 – Management and monitoring

Under the overall supervision of the INTERPOL Counter-Terrorism Directorate, a Project Manager supported by a project assistant in INTERPOL’s Maritime Security Sub-directorate will manage the implementation of PSE 2. As part of PSE 2, MTS will be strengthened by two Project Mentors and one Project Analyst. The Project Manager, Project Assistant, and Project Analyst will be based at INTERPOL’s Headquarters in Lyon, France, while Project Mentors will be based in the region (location to be confirmed). INTEPOL will participate in the Cross-Engagement Coordination Committee that meets twice yearly in meetings called by the Embassy in Accra through the Maritime Security Programme Advisor (see section 5.1).

### PSE 2 – Engagement budget

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2022** | **2023** | **2024** | **2025** | **2026** | **Total DKK** | **Total EUR** |
| Output 1.1 | 0.84 | 1.02 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 2.16 | 0.29 |
| Output 1.2 | 0.07 | 0.70 | 0.47 | 0.64 | 0.46 | 2.35 | 0.32 |
| Output 2.1 | 0.09 | 1.18 | 0.79 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 2.28 | 0.31 |
| Output 2.2 | 0.07 | 0.86 | 0.09 | 0.80 | 0.08 | 1.90 | 0.26 |
| Sub total | 1.08 | 3.76 | 1.45 | 1.66 | 0.74 | 8.69 | 1.17 |
| Personnel costs | 1.54 | 2.59 | 2.59 | 2.59 | 1.53 | 10.86 | 1.46 |
| Direct support costs | 0.42 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.68 | 2.14 | 0.29 |
| **Subtotal** | **1.96** | **2.94** | **2.94** | **2.94** | **2.22** | **13.00** | **1.75** |
| Contingency (2%) | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.43 | 0.06 |
| Overhead (13 %) | 0.40 | 0.89 | 0.58 | 0.61 | 0.39 | 2.88 | 0.39 |
| **TOTAL (DKK)** | **3.50** | **7.72** | **5.07** | **5.31** | **3.41** | **25.00** | **3.36** |

*Exchange rate 1 EUR = 7.437 DKK. Amounts in DKK are governing.*

### PSE 2 – Results Framework

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Project objective** | | Beneficiary countries Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo are tackling maritime-based crime more effectively through deeper investigations into the wider organisational structures of organised criminal groups and reinforced security at port facilities. | |
| Impact indicator | | Number of regionally coordinated investigations conducted and admitted in case prosecutions. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | Isolated investigations of the lower-ranking members of crime syndicates involved in maritime-based crime. Investigations and prosecutions do not target the leadership structure of the organised crime groups. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | Beneficiary countries’ investigations aim to dismantle criminal groups, rather than focusing on the low-level perpetrators at sea. |
| **Outcome 1** | | Maritime law enforcement improves by strengthening beneficiary units’ crime scene management and evidence collection skills and ability to debrief former hostages. | |
| Outcome indicator | | Number of cases where evidence collected at crime scenes is admitted in case prosecutions. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | Four (4) piracy-related cases admitted in case prosecutions (3 in Togo, 1 in Benin between 2015 - 2020). |
| Target | Year | 2026 | A cumulative total of 5 cases over the course of the implementation where evidence collected at crime scenes is admitted in prosecutions. |
| **Outcome 2** | | Improved safety and security in the GoG through stronger security measures at key port facilities and enhanced law enforcement skills to prevent, detect, investigate, and respond to threats to port security. | |
| Outcome indicator | | Number of incidents related to port security (comprising all crime types) decrease by 25%. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | TBD (Survey to beneficiary countries / fact-finding missions). |
| Target | Year | 2026 | TBD |

## Engagement 3 – KAIPTC: Integrated Responses to Threats to Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Domain

### PSE 3 – Overview

The engagement with KAIPTC/WPSI leverages the regional role and convening power of this African Centre for Peacekeeping. KAIPTC has a solid track record of conducting policy and practice related research and applying this knowledge to training development and convening policy fora. The aim is to foster stronger, more cohesive, and effective national and regional approaches to maritime security and an enhanced rate of implementation of the Yaoundé process.

Synergies exist with the other engagements of the DMSP 3 and will be sought exploited through in particular joint training with UNODC on WPS, and collaboration with UNODC, the RDDC and other relevant regional and international actors on policy driven thematic reports (sections 5.3 and 5.5). This engagement will build on research, dialogue and capacity development activities implemented by KAIPTC during DMSP 2 of the maritime security programme. During the 2019-2021 programme, 190 mid-career practitioners in the maritime security sector and civil society advocates in 13 coastal states in West and Central Africa were trained. Policy-based dialogues were informed by the development of 10 research products.

Regional research and policy formulation capacity that integrates WPS action will form the basis for capacity development activities to enhance institutional and practitioner skillsets to respond to the challenges in the maritime domain. The engagement will institutionalise convening platform (s) for regular dialogue, and collaborative and consensus-based decisions taken amongst relevant maritime authorities and experts. In addition to continuing existing capacity development activities targeted at state actors, PSE 3 will broaden the scope to look at the roles of non-state actors such as fisheries and the media.

KAIPTC and WPSI will take a regional agenda-setting role to address the gap between the articulation and operationalisation of the WPS agenda in instruments of the African Union, ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Gulf of Guinea coastal countries through a combination of policy-focussed research, WPS focussed training, and convening of African networks of policy makers and experts.

KAIPTC is uniquely placed to capitalise on recent WPS policy initiatives. In April 2021, ECOWAS launched the guidelines on WPS, which encourages the Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Department of ECOWAS and member states to commit to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. The aim is to include gender mainstreaming in the process of planning, designing and implementation of interventions, including follow-up and evaluation. The combined effect of the revised African Union (AU) African Maritime Charter of 2016 and the Agenda 2030, provides a mandate towards embedded contributions and roles for women across the peace and security spectrum. It is important to effectively identify and harness the required policy and operational issues for empowering women and other at-risk groups in the maritime domain as well as promoting increased numbers of women in the maritime domain.

To ensure understanding of issues and opportunities available to women in the maritime domain KAIPTC will identify and consult with women leaders in the maritime domain to learn from their perspective, the pertinent issues, practices, protocols, and norms that require to be harnessed and harmonized into an *African Code of Maritime Practice Women in the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Domain*. Conceived along the lines of the Vancouver Principles for the protection of children in peacekeeping theatres, the envisaged code of practice for African women in the maritime domain is expected to be adopted by national, regional, and inter-regional actors. This includes the ICC in Yaoundé, Cameroon, as a guiding principle for inclusive national policy formulation for member-states of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. The proposed code of practice for women in the maritime domain is expected to reinforce the attainment of Agenda 2030 of the AU.

Table 10 – Overview of PSE 3 results areas

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Engagement Objective | Strengthened regional approaches to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through enhanced joined-up responses to shared threats. |
| Outcome 1 | Enhanced collaboration and cooperation among state and non-state maritime actors in the GoG |
|  |  |
| Outcome 2 | Strengthened capacity and approaches state and non-state maritime actors applied, including the media. |

1 – Enhanced evidence-based understanding of barriers to strengthened national and regional response to maritime crime.

This pillar of PSE 3 relates to the generation and dissemination of knowledge products through research to form the basis of activities of the other two project pillars (i.e., dialogue and capacity building). Based on existing understanding of key maritime security issues, the project shall work with experts and practitioners in the GoG maritime domain through consultations and expert workshops to frame the core research gaps to be pursued[[23]](#footnote-24). This will include leveraging the capacities of KAIPTC’s Women’s Peace and Security Institute (WPSI) in the maritime domain sector, as well as collaboration with UNODC. Out of the above consultations, the project shall prioritize the broad set of topics to focus on and pursue in-depth investigations into the selected areas. These studies would lead to the production of policy papers that frame the issues for dialogue to ensure focused discussions in an iterative way. Furthermore, the project will organize regular research seminars as the first line of disseminating project research findings.

2 – Enhanced regional collaboration to address maritime security issues

KAIPTC will leverage its convening power to establish a forum for regular dialogues among international and national actors such as ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC and other relevant regional economic communities (RECs) of the African Union (AU) for ensuring awareness of and effective management of the maritime security domain in Africa, including expected national commitments to regional and international protocols. The dialogues shall include specific events for policy level actors but also technical level dialogues involving operational level practitioners. The approach resonates the key responsibilities in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCC) the project will through peer learning and dialogue contribute to strengthen institutions established to address maritime security issues in the GoG, such as the ICC.

3 – Enhanced capacity of state and non-state maritime actors to support implementation of maritime security policies with due attention to gender aspects

A specific maritime security course targeted at state actors involved in managing GoG maritime challenges was developed and implemented during DMSP 2. Course participants reported significant increased knowledge of GoG maritime challenges, regional and national arrangements, as well as their role in supporting the implementation of the national and regional maritime initiatives. Through PSE 3 KAIPTC will continue to offer the maritime security course regionally with periodic review of the course content to respond to emerging realities in the maritime environment. It is envisaged that the reviewed course will include modules on women and gender in the GoG maritime environment.

As part of PSE 3 KAIPTC will develop a new course on “Maritime Security Reporting”. The aim of this course is to enhance the knowledge of media personnel of GoG maritime security issues, including gendered aspects, to ensure accurate reporting of maritime crimes and other occurrences in the maritime environment. This course will evolve through consultations with media associations in some selected GoG countries to understand their needs. The needs assessment will be followed by a Learning, Design and Development (LDD) session to define the outcome and key thematic components of the course. Experts for the LDD session will be drawn from the media and maritime security field. The Workshop will target journalists who report on security matters in print, digital and broadcast media houses.

Issues of gender and women in the maritime domain sector is a key research area of the project and as the evidence-based understanding of the issues evolve as part of the project, relevant capacity development initiatives for both state and non-state actors will be developed.

### PSE 3 – Choice of partner

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre is a regional leader in terms of its collaborative capacity to assemble and engage relevant actors to address thematic challenges. KAIPTC has a memorandum of understanding to become the official training centre of excellence of ECOWAS for operational level capacity development in support of the peace and security interventions of ECOWAS in West Africa. The KAIPTC recently signed a similar MoU with the AU, strengthening its visibility, goodwill, and operational leverage across the African continent.

KAIPTC has been a long-standing Danish partner and is satisfactory implementing a similar engagement under DMSP 2 and has collaborated with RDDC under the non-ODA component of that programme. It is a well-respected research and training institution with strong links to the Ghanaian Government, to ECOWAS, and the ICC. KAIPTC all has procedures and management capacity in place and is conversant with administrative, reporting, and financial management related to implementing Danish funded peace and security engagements. Its Women’s Peace and Security Institute is a regional centre of excellency currently implementing a land focussed Danish WPS programme in West Africa and the Sahel.

### PSE 3 – Management and monitoring

KAIPTC will manage the engagement as the implementing partner. The engagement will be anchored in the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR) and be managed following best practices in transparent and accountable project management. It will thus utilise annual work plans and report against these as well as against the engagement’s results framework. The engagement will have a project team comprising a project coordinator, two project officers and a financial assistant. Short-term staff may also be recruited for activities, and their inputs will be based upon clear terms of reference. KAIPTC will participate in the Cross-Engagement Coordination Committee that meets twice yearly in meetings called by the Embassy in Accra through the Maritime Security Programme Advisor (see section 5.1)

KAIPTC will establish a Steering Committee comprising senior representatives from KAIPTC and cooperation partners such as ECOWAS, ECCAS, ICC in Cameroon, the Danish Embassy in Accra, the ECOWAS Coordination Centre in Cote d’Ivoire (i.e., CRESMAO) and other relevant actors where necessary. The committee shall consider and approve annual proposals from the project team, including commitments to set activities, narrative and financial reporting, monitoring and evaluation, gender, communications and financial audits of project activities and disbursements. The Steering Committee will meet at least once a year.

### PSE 3 – Engagement budget

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2022** | **2023** | **2024** | **2025** | **2026** | **Total** |
| Output 1-1 - research | 0.46 | 0.58 | 0.29 | 0.38 | 0.25 | 1.95 |
| Output 1.2 – dialogue events | 0.25 | 1.75 | 1.39 | 1.03 | 0.00 | 4.42 |
| Output 2.1 – training courses | 0.83 | 1.35 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.32 | 3.85 |
| Other project costs | 0.16 | 0.01 | 0.20 | 0.01 | 0.20 | 0.59 |
| Personnel | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 2.38 |
| Administrative support/contribution to KAIPTC | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 1.13 |
| Contingency | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.09 |
| **TOTAL (DKK)** | **2.42** | **4.42** | **3.30** | **2.79** | **1.49** | **14.41** |

### PSE 3 – Results framework

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Project objective** | | Strengthened regional approaches to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through enhanced joined-up responses to shared threats. | |
| Impact indicator | | % of national and regional maritime security actors utilizing the outputs of the project to promote collaboration and cooperation in the maritime domain. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | To be established (baseline study) |
| Target | Year | 2026 | State actors and non-state actors promote maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and media provides balanced and independent news coverage on maritime security issues. |
| **Outcome 1** | | Enhanced collaboration and cooperation among state and non-state maritime actors in the GoG | |
| Outcome indicator | | % of national and regional maritime security actors utilizing the outputs of the project to promote collaboration and cooperation in the maritime domain. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | To be established (baseline study) |
| Target | Year | 2026 | At least 50% of direct project beneficiaries utilize the project outputs to promote collaborative responses to threats to safety and security in the GoG maritime domain. (End of Project survey) |
| **Outcome 2** | | Strengthened capacity and approaches among state and non-state maritime actors and stakeholders applied, including in the media | |
| Outcome indicator | | % Of maritime actors who reported on improved knowledge on maritime issues in the GoG maritime domain and national and regional arrangements to prevent maritime crimes. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | No actors have reported |
| Target | Year | 2026 | 90% of maritime actors trained by KAIPTC reported on improved knowledge on maritime issues in the GoG maritime domain and national and regional arrangements to prevent maritime crimes. (Source: KAIPTC monitoring records and follow-up survey) |

## Engagement 4 – DCD Maritime Domain Awareness and Operational Response

### PSE 4 – Overview

PSE 4 is aligned within the Yaoundé Architecture. It will focus on five (5) strands of activities to contribute to specific areas and relates Outcomes (see table 9):

1. Maritime operational planning and Maritime Domain Awareness training and practice with the aim to ensure a more effective utilisation of the maritime situation picture leading to timely decision making as part of Maritime Domain Awareness.
2. Enhancing military operational responses
3. Integrated military-civilian VBSS capabilities to strengthen boarding, search, and seizure skills, protect evidence, and ensure human rights observance.
4. Strengthening cooperation between civilian and maritime security sector actors and institutions
5. Building up sustainable response forces.

Table 11 – Overview of PSE 4 results areas

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Engagement Objective | Capacity of regional actors to respond to piracy, robbery at sea and other threats to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is strengthened. |
| Outcome 1 | Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness capacity, cooperation, and interoperability amongst West African coastal states. |
| Outcome 2 | Capacity of Ghanaian maritime special forces to be sustainable build up to squadron level and respond to piracy and armed robbery at sea enhanced in line with international standards and rule of law. |
| Outcome 3 | Navy personnel from Zone E (Togo, Benin, Nigeria), Zone D (Cameroon) and Zone F (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana) are trained to conduct military and integrated Maritime Interception Operations (*Implemented by UNODC under separate agreement with MOD/DCD).* |
| Outcome 4 | Enhanced communication and cooperation among maritime stakeholders. |
| Outcome 5 | Capacity of maritime law enforcement agencies with focus on Nigeria and Ghana to respond to maritime crime at sea. |

1 – Maritime operational planning training and MDA – Royal Danish Navy

Denmark will contribute to operational planning and will promote more effective use of the maritime domain awareness data available, including its communication from one country to the next in a manner that is cohesive and useful. This contribution will take the form of training to ensure participants have the basic knowledge and skills necessary to act as maritime planning staff officers at a tactical and operational level, in a multinational maritime context or component (e.g., Commander Task Force or Commander Task Group) where English is the working language. In addition, it will provide participants with the opportunity of building relationships and networks across countries, to enhance the level of trust and cooperation between the coastal states in the region.

The assessment of the targets will be conducted using OBANGAME EXPRESS and Grand African NEMO. The exercises are designed to address identified technical needs amongst participants. OBANGAME EXPRESS and Grand African NEMO pursue its goal by creating realistic scenarios around a hijacked vessel or a vessel involved in unlawful act. Maritime Operation Centres are challenged to properly identify the incident and share the information with the other Maritime Operation Centres along the coast. The maritime forces of the individual countries are also challenged in their allocated zones as well as their ability to find and secure evidence to subsequently prosecute illegal activity. The education uses exercises in boarding procedures and techniques (see outcome 2). At the same time, emphasis is placed on assessing and improving the response units' response capacity for maritime intervention as well as planning operations and coordination with Maritime Operations Centres. Finally, the aim is to build training units in order that the units can then pass on learned technical and tactical skills to their own units. In this way, the exercise provides linkages between MOCs, MMCCs, CRESMAO and the ICC. It will strengthen the ICC’s role in establishing a common system linking national and regional capacities.

This engagement will focus on already operational zonal centres and its member states being zone E (that includes Nigeria), F (that includes Ghana) and D (that include Cameroon). The MMCCs for these zones are in Benin, Ghana, and Douala respectively. The perspective of the engagement is both national, multinational, and regional. An important facilitator for the training will be the production of suitable training material based upon standard operating procedures (SOPs), which will require involvement of the ICC, CRESMAO and MMCCs.

Denmark’s contribution to this outcome area will be provided by Danish Navy experts with relevant operational experience in MDA and in planning and exercises who will be deployed to the region during the exercise and course period. Denmark will also contribute to the development of the SOP and training material, which may require additional visits to the region. This support will be coordinated by the Maritime Military Adviser in consultation with the ICC, US Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF), and Danish authorities.

2 – Enhancing military operational responses - SOCOM

The Danish contribution to this outcome area will be provided by SOCOM. This outcome will build the Ghana SBS operational capabilities, applying NATO standard tools for developing and sustaining military capabilities, to focus resource allocation in time and space, and to measure concrete progress within the individual years and outcome targets. Developing the Ghana SBS capability within the Ghana Navy will be a complex endeavour, which means that the engagement will have to be adjusted as the results are analysed. Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS will be a key assessment “tool” for guiding future efforts and activities.3 – Visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) - UNODC

This engagement will use permanent VBSS training centres in Nigeria and Ghana established with ODA compatible Danish bridging funding implemented by UNODC for 2021-2022. UNODC will provide non-ODA funded VBSS training relevant in various compliant/non-compliant and opposed/unopposed scenarios for military and integrated Maritime Interception Operations (MIO). UNODC will be contracted to train navy personnel from Zone E (Togo, Benin, Nigeria), Zone D (Cameroon) and Zone F (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana). The Danish support will be the first-time personnel from these regional navies will be offered in-service training trajectories to develop progressive VBSS skills up to VBSS Instructor level. (See PSED 1 for details).

4 – Strengthening cooperation between civilian and maritime security sector institutions - RDDC

The RDDC will provide the Danish contribution to this outcome area. The precise arrangements will be coordinated with the Maritime Military Advisers in conjunction with relevant national authorities.

This outcome area foresees the involvement of several different partners that will help facilitate programme implementation. Based on experience and in synergy with DMSP 2, KAIPTC and MMCC Z F are likely partners. Identifying more potential partners will be a priority.

5 – Building up sustainable response forces – Royal Danish Navy

The Danish contribution to this outcome area will be provided by the Danish Navy or other Danish authorities and institutions. The precise arrangements will be coordinated with the Maritime Military Adviser in conjunction with Ghana and Nigeria Navies and relevant national authorities in Ghana and Nigeria, Defence Command Denmark, and other Danish Defence authorities. Indicative activities for Outcome will be developed yearly in detail through an internal OPLAN process at the DCD. Examples of activities identified by the Ghana Navy could be Navigation Ship Simulator training, Ships Damage Control training, Firefighting training. This outcome foresees that training will initially be conducted using national Danish training instructions but could also support building up sustainable training facilities in Ghana and, therefore, shift to training support in Ghana with instructors from the Danish Navy and other Danish authorities and institutions.

### PSE 4 – Choice of partners

The engagement will be directly implemented by the Defence Command Denmark, alongside subordinate entities under its authority within the Danish defence system. The latter include the Royal Danish Navy for Outcome 1, the Special Operational Command (SOCOM) for Outcome 2 and the Royal Danish Defence College for Outcome 4, and Danish Navy or other Danish authorities and institutions for Outcome 5.

UNODC has been chosen as the implementing partner for Outcome 3. This proposal falls well within the strategies and agreement made between the ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC concerning tackling the maritime crime threat in the region under the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and coordination by the Inter-regional Coordination Centre. UNODC runs VBSS courses at established centres in Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Seychelles. With ongoing Danish bridging support in 2021-2022, UNODC will establish permanent VBSS training centres in Nigeria and Ghana to provide ODA compatible training. UNODC has extensive experience and a track record of results in providing maritime law enforcement mentorships, both civilian (ODA) and military (non-ODA). UNODC developed several training tools, including an MLE training catalogue and a VBSS training guide to enable law enforcement officers to expand their knowledge on the fight against maritime crime and other illicit activities at sea. Training courses are offered in several areas of tackling maritime crime on a progressive scale of basic, advanced and instructor courses. Graduates from the instructor course become Certified National Instructors.

### PSE 4 – Management and monitoring

Two Advisers (MA), in Abuja and Accra also act as Defence Attaché (DEFAT) to Nigeria and Ghana. As such, the MAs are part of the overall staff at the Danish Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria and Accra, Ghana and are posted under the Special Attaché Order and administratively under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Danish Defence as an employer. The Danish Defence therefore pays a settlement fee to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which covers the administrative costs relating to the MAs.

The Maritime Military Advisor (MMA) in Abuja has been assigned **PSED 4 engagement manager** duties and will execute these in close cooperation with Defence Command Denmark, especially on financial issues. Defence Command Denmark has discretionary authority to reassign PSE engagement manager responsibilities to the MA Accra during implementation (see Annex B.) The MMA in capacity as PSED 4 engagement manager will also refer to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra as Program Manager. Implementing partners will operate under the guidance of the PSED 4 engagement manager and Danish Defence Command. The MMA Abuja will participate in the Cross-Engagement Coordination Committee that meets twice yearly in meetings called by the Embassy in Accra through the Maritime Security Programme Advisor (see section 5.1)

* Outcome 1 will be implemented by the Royal Danish Navy Command,
* Outcome 2 will be implemented by the Danish Special Operations Command.
* Outcome 3 will be implemented by UNODC under a separate Financing Agreement. Detailed procedures are described in PSED 1.
* Outcome 4 will be implemented by the Danish Defence College
* Outcome 5 will be implemented by the Danish Navy or other Danish authorities and institutions.

The assigned PSED 4 engagement manager will coordinate with the Danish Ministry of Defence, Defence Command Denmark, and the Danish Embassy in Accra. As per their respective accreditations, the embassies in Accra and Abuja will take responsibility for programme-related issues, if any, related to Gulf of Guinea countries included in the programme. The embassy in Accra will set up a **Contact Group** tofunction as a forum promoting whole-of-government coherence, agile implementation, and adaptive management throughout the implementation period. The composition of the contact group includes, but is not necessarily limited to, relevant departments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Defence Command Denmark, and the Military Advisors (Abuja, Accra) will participate in the Contact Group (See Programme Document for details).

### PSE 4 – Engagement budget

Table 12 – PSE 4 Outcome level budget (DKK million)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | *New Defence Agreement* | | |  |
|  | **2022** | **2023** | **2024** | **2025** | **2026** | **Total** |
| Maritime Military Advisor Abuja | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 18 |
| Maritime Military Advisor Accra | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 11 |
| Danish Navy (Outcomes 1 and 5) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| Danish Special Operations Command  (Outcome 2) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 25 |
| VBSS through PSE 1 (UNODC)  (Outcome 3) | 2.5 | 5.0 |  |  |  | 7.5 |
| Royal Danish Defence College  (Outcome 4) | 0.5 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 4.5 |
| Allocations pending Defence Agreement |  |  | 5 | 5 | 5 | 15 |
| Miscellaneous /shared expenses with MFA | 0.2 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 9 |
| Total | 15 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 95 |

Note: the total amount of secured funding is DKK 35 million for 2022 and 2023, amounts mentioned for years 2024, 2025, 2026 (shaded) pending a renewed mandate as part of the next generation Defence Agreement (*Forsvarsforlig*).

### PSE 4 – Results framework

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Project objective** | | Capacity of regional actors to respond to piracy, robbery at sea and other threats to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is strengthened. | |
| Impact indicator | | Nigeria and Ghana and other beneficiary countries will have increased capacity to detect, share information and manage responses to threats to shipping and seafarers; a stronger basis to prosecute maritime crime; and interregional, regional organizations and coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea will have increased capacities, capabilities and frameworks feeding into operational and sustainable MDA and responses to emergencies/incidents. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | Limited real time sharing of MDA data.  Limited operational response and now sustainable force generation.  19 convictions for piracy following successful hand over, of which 10 in Nigeria and 9 in Togo.  Uncertainty on the role played by various agencies and actors. Existing but unclear lines communication and information exchange between various actors – both general and incident-related.  Ghanaian navy trained in vessel boarding and related aspects (e.g., securing evidence, human rights) as part of a rule of law-based response. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | Coastal states in Zones E, F & D access and share MDA data and utilise it effectively in operational planning (as tested in multilateral maritime security exercises).  Ghana capable of sustainable force generation and respond operationally using trained units in boarding operations.  Frequent contact and dialogue between stakeholders outside formal seminar/workshop structures.  Ghanaian navy is conducting and supporting law enforcement agencies in vessel boarding as part of a rule of law-based response. |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Outcome 1** | | Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness capacity, cooperation, and interoperability amongst West African coastal states | |
| Outcome indicator | | Extent and quality of MDA, especially operation planning and decision making, along with regional/national interaction leading to operational response | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | Limited real time sharing of MDA data |
| Target | Year | 2026 | Coastal states in Zones E, F & D access and share MDA data and utilise it effectively in operational planning (as tested in multilateral maritime security exercises) |
| **Outcome 2** | | Capacity of Ghanaian maritime special forces to be sustainable build up to squadron level and respond to piracy and armed robbery at sea enhanced in line with international standards and rule of law. | |
| Outcome indicator | | Sustainable force generation, extent, and quality (response time, quality of boarding and evidence collection) of regional/national response to piracy, robbery at sea and other maritime security incidents increased | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | Limited operational response and now sustainable force generation. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | Ghana capable of sustainable force generation and respond operationally using trained units in boarding operations |
| **Outcome 3**  (see also Outcome 5 PSE 1) | | Navy personnel from Zone E (Togo, Benin, Nigeria), Zone D (Cameroon) and Zone F (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana) can detect, interdict, arrest, seize and hand over in the maritime domain, enhancing coordination between UNODC, INTERPOL and Defence Command Denmark | |
| Outcome indicator 3.1 | | Number of individuals suspected of piracy and other maritime crimes brought to court with an effective hand over | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | 19 convictions for piracy following successful hand over, of which 10 in Nigeria and 9 in Togo. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | Year on year increase in handover of suspects for piracy and maritime crimes to the justice systems. |
| **Outcome 4** | | Enhanced communication and cooperation among maritime stakeholders | |
| Outcome indicator 4.1 | | Increase in formal, informal, and/or institutional communication within and between national, zonal, and regional authorities, as well as with and between other stakeholders, such as the maritime industry and relevant civil society actors. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | Uncertainty on the role played by various agencies and actors. Existing but unclear lines communication and information exchange between various actors – both general and incident-related. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | Frequent contact and dialogue between stakeholders outside formal seminar/workshop structures |
| **Outcome 5** | | Capacity of maritime law enforcement agencies with focus on Nigeria and Ghana to respond to maritime crime at sea | |
| Outcome indicator 5.1 | | Enhancing basic skills for ships crews to maintain operational standards and readiness to respond. | |
| Baseline | Year | 2021 | Limited operational response. |
| Target | Year | 2026 | Nigeria and Ghana respond enhanced operationally using better trained ships crews in basic seamanship. |

# Overview of management set-up

## Overview of programme management

At the strategic level, the programme will report to and receive guidance from the **PSF Steering Committee.**

The **Deputy Head of Mission** (DHOM) at the **RDE Accra** will be responsible for the programme’s overall management. The internationally recruited **Maritime Security Programme Advisor (MSPA)** will support the DHOM with day-to-day management. The MSPA will ensure close collaboration and coordination with the **Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja (MMA-Abuja)**, the designated lead on PSE 4[[24]](#footnote-25), assisted by **Military Advisor in Accra (MA-Accra)** on issues concerning the DKK 95 million contribution-ODA funds from the Danish Ministry of Defence. Since the Embassy in Abuja is accredited to ECOWAS, the DMSP 3 related interaction with ECOWAS will be agreed between Accra and Abuja on a case-to-case basis.

The MMA-Abuja will coordinate with the Danish Ministry of Defence, Defence Command Denmark, and the Danish Embassy in Accra. As per their respective accreditations, the embassies in Accra and Abuja will take responsibility for programme-related issues, if any, related to the Gulf of Guinea countries included in the programme.

In line with Doing Development Differently principles, the RDE will set up a **Contact Group** of relevant departments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Defence Command Denmark. The contact group will consist of, but not necessarily be limited to, the Deputy Head of Mission, Accra, the Maritime Security Adviser (Accra) and the Military Advisors (Abuja, Accra) and function as a forum promoting whole-of-government coherence, agile implementation, and adaptive management throughout the implementation period.


The RDE will also set up a **Cross-Engagement Coordination Committee (CCEC)** that will consist of a core group of the engagement managers of the three ODA funded engagements (UNODC, INTERPOL and KAIPTC) and the MMA-Abuja and relevant members of their respective implementation teams, when deemed relevant. The MPSA will organise the virtual meetings of the CCEC twice per year on a schedule that is optimised to inform the annual programme reporting (see Annex 13).

For PSE 1 and PSE 2, the Danish support will be earmarked contributions to UNODC’s GMCP and INTERPOL. These partners’ management and reporting arrangements will be utilised. The principal interlocutor with UNODC and INTERPOL will be the Maritime Security Advisor in Accra in close consultation with the Maritime Military Advisors in Abuja, particularly on the VBSS training component PSE 1 that MFA and MOD/DCD co-fund. Detailed division of related responsibilities of the Military Advisor in Accra will be at the discretion of Defence Command Denmark.

PSE 3 will provide a significant vehicle for dialogue with national, regional, and international maritime security actors on policy and technical issues. It will be highly relevant for Denmark to be closely engaged. For PSE 3, a close programmatic follow up is envisioned with regular meetings at KAIPTC. The MSPA will take the lead in the interaction with KAIPTC, except where PSE 4 related aspects are concerned, in which case the Military Advisor in Abuja or Accra will lead.

For PSE 4, the MMA-Abuja will, assisted by MA-Accra, liaise directly with Defence Command Denmark and the Danish Ministry of Defence and local actors, including US NAVAF and other like-minded donors. The day-to-day management will rest with MMA-Abuja in close cooperation with Defence Command Denmark, especially on financial issues, including the non-ODA VBSS contribution to UNODC.

Figure 2 – Programme organisational diagram



## Adaptive management

The DMSP 3 is aligned with the principles of Doing Development Differently (DDD). DDD prioritises systematic adaptive management that is particularly relevant for coherent and responsive Danish engagement on piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea. Adaptive management is built into the DMSP 3 implementation set up as follows.

1. A Contact Group of involved Danish institutions and departments that regularly meets and functions as a forum promoting whole-of-government coherence, agile implementation, and adaptive management throughout the implementation period. (Section 5.1)
2. The UNODC Regional Monitoring Hub and the regular partner meetings that it will organise (section 4.4.1)
3. A Cross-Engagement Coordination Committee (section 5.1) meets at least twice a year to ensure coordination and realisation of potential synergies between the PSEs as identified in the DMSP 3 Programme Document (section 4.2, Table 6) and detailed in the respective PSEDs. New opportunities arising during implementation may need flexible and adaptive cross-engagement cooperation (CECC ToR in Annex 13).
4. Programme and engagement results-based monitoring as part of monitoring, evaluation, accountability MEAL (section 5.6)
5. The implementing partners may suggest adaptation of their engagements at output or outcome level, depending upon the effects of changes to context or MEAL information. The partners will monitor assumptions, risks, and progress – with support from the MSPA and MEL Coordinator (section 5.6 and Annexes 9 and 10. Respectively). This information will be used to assess if the project theory of change holds or whether there is a need for adaptation. This assessment will also be a regular part of the reporting arrangements, and partners will flag potential issues through their reporting. In case of the need for adjustment, the partner will provide detailed justification and recommendations on adaptation to the Embassy in Accra (PSE 1, 2 and 3) and the Embassy in Abuja/MMA Abuja (non-ODA VBSS implemented by UNODC). Any adaptation required will need to be formally endorsed by the Embassy in Accra that will refer major issues to the PSF Steering Committee.

## Red lines

The DMSP 3 will be implemented in accordance with Denmark’s zero-tolerance policies towards (i) Anti-corruption; (ii) Child labour; (iii) Sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEAH); and (iv) Anti-terrorism. Specific articles on these will be included in the legal agreements for PSEs 1, 2 and 3, where it is specified that violations will be grounds for immediate termination of the agreement. PSE 4 will not have a legal agreement as it is implemented directly by the Danish state through DCD and Denmark’s regulations in the above respects automatically apply.

See also section 5.6 below regarding anti-corruption.

## Approval of unallocated funds

Decisions relating to the use of unallocated funds relating to PSEs 1, 2 and 3 will be taken by the Danish Embassy in Accra based upon short proposals/addendums to existing projects from implementing partners. These will also consider any recommendations in this regard from the Mid Term Review. All such additions will be ODA-eligible and could include policy driven research projects involving one or more of the implementing partners in collaboration with other regional or international actors, additional activities stemming from UNODC’s VBSS needs assessment to be conducted in 2022, or from the DMSP 3 scaled up investment in WPS (see also section 5.5)

Decisions relating to the use of unallocated funds relating to PSE 4 will be taken by Danish Defence Command based upon short proposals/addendums to existing projects from the Maritime Military Advisor and/or other relevant sources. Such decisions will be discussed with the Ministry of Defence and with the Danish Embassy in Accra prior to approval. All such additions will utilise non-ODA funds.

## Technical assistance

Technical assistance provided by external experts is a key modality through which this programme will deliver its results and the arrangements for this are described in the individual engagement sections above.

To support overall programme implementation, one international/regional and two locally recruited advisors are planned:

1. **Maritime Security Programme Advisor**. The Maritime Security Programme Advisor is responsible for day-to-day management of the programme, including coordination with implementing partners and the Military Advisers in Accra and Abuja. The MSPA is responsible for the timely issuing of mandatory PSF reports (see Table 13), inputting to internal MFA results monitoring systems and communication of results. The **MSPA** **reports to the Deputy Head of Mission in Accra.** The MSPA will be based at the vicinity of the Embassy in Accra. The MSPA ToR are attached at Annex 9. The Embassy of Denmark in Accra will recruit a suitably qualified individual based upon these ToR upon programme approval
2. **Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Coordinator.** In relation to overall programme monitoring and support to engagement partners where this is needed, a **full-time locally recruited MEL Coordinator.** This person will **report to the MSPA** have expert knowledge of Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and results-based management and ideally also a solid understanding of the maritime security environment, thereby enabling him/her to interact with the implementing partners as well as other stakeholders. A key function of this advisor will be to supervise and support the reporting from the four engagement partners. For PSEs 1, 2 and 3, this will involve drawing from the partners’ standard reporting. For PSE 4, it will involve close consultation with the Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja. The MEL Coordinator will be located at KAIPTC in Accra. The MEL Coordinator’s ToR are attached at Annex 10. The Embassy of Denmark in Accra will recruit a suitably qualified individual based upon these ToR upon programme approval.
3. **Civil Maritime Advisor (CMA), Abuja.** The CMA has a twofold function and will (i) support the embassy in Abuja, including supporting the embassy’s DMSP 3 related interactions with ECOWAS, as relevant (ii) interact with the Nigerian authorities concerned with PSE 1 and PSE 2 – and with UNODC and INTERPOL respectively. S/he will have a proven track record in promoting the Maritime **Women Peace and Security** agenda and support the WPS strands of work with UNODC (PSE 1) and the Women Peace and Security Institute of KAIPTC (PSE 3). The CMA will also participate in donor coordination meetings. ToR for the CMA are included at Annex. It is envisaged to locally recruit a Civil Maritime Advisor. The CMA will work off-premises in the vicinity of the Embassy in Abuja. The CMA ToR are attached in Annex 11. The Embassies in Accra and Abuja will jointly recruit a suitably qualified individual based upon these ToR upon programme approval.

## Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning

The MSPA (lead) and the MEL Coordinator (assisting) will develop and operationalise a **Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning Plan (MEAL Plan)** to assist the managing and reporting of the programme. The MEAL Plan will be updated regularly and include measures to monitor the ToC assumptions.

The DMSP 3 MEAL includes the following dimensions of monitoring:

* **Programme and engagement results-based monitoring** draws on engagement partner monitoring systems and practices. The MSPS will prepare the mandatory PSED Level Bi-Annual Reports and annual DMSP 3 Programme Level Reports in the required formats as per the AMG and submit to the embassy in Accra for approval. Monitoring of risks and assumptions is part of annual programme reporting.
* The UNODC Regional Monitoring Hub baselines and reports
* **Mid Term Review** with the purpose of assessing overall progress and determining whether major changes to the programme’s result areas are required.
* **Strategic monitoring of regional trends.** Strategic monitoring of regional trends to inform coordination (SDG 17)
* **Policy agenda driven reports** with a focus on, among others, **political economy dimensions** of piracy and other maritime crimescan be an effective way to leverage the engagement partnerships and promote Danish priorities and will be considered where relevant.
* **Monitoring of financial management** (see section 5.6)

As discussed in section 5.4, the MEAL includes a MEL Coordinator. The MSPA will be overall responsible to anchor the above dimensions of monitoring.

**Programme and engagement results-based monitoring.** The programme’s implementing partners will undertake regular monitoring of progress against results as well as developments in key assumptions and risks. This will feed into bi-annual PSED narrative and financial reports, and annual Programme Level Reports that will be prepared by the MEL Coordinator and reviewed by the MPSA prior to submission by the Danish Embassy in Accra to the PSF Secretariat.

Table 13 – PSED and programme level reporting cycle

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Engagement narrative progress reports** | Reporting cycle: **1 March / 1 September (bi-annually)**  Format: Engagement partner format (PSED format preferred)  Responsible: Engagement partner as specified in PSED |
| **PSED Level Bi-Annual Reports** | Reportingcycle: **1 April / 1 October**  Format: PSED format as per Aid Management Guidelines  Responsible: MEL Coordinator (supervision by MSPA) |
| **DMSP 3 Programme Level Reports** | Reportingcycle: **1 April (annually)**  Format: PSED format as per Aid Management Guidelines  Responsible: MSPA (input from MEL Coordinator) |

*The above reporting goes for all PSE’s, but additional reporting might adhere to PSE 4 as per DCD Guidelines.*

**A Mid Term Review (MTR)** of the programme will be undertaken at a point in the second quarter of 2024 (to be concluded by July 2024). The MTR will also provide an opportunity to take account of indications on the next Defence Agreement (*Forsvarsforli*g) and its implications for PSE 4 – DCD in 2024 and 2026. The MTR is an opportunity to make adjustments to all the engagements as part of an adaptive programming approach, given that the engagements are heavily dependent upon local authorities’ buy-in, and there are risks attached to this. Where this is appropriate, changes will be in line with the programme outcomes and outputs as described in this document and which are flexible. Funds for contracting external assistance for the MTR have been included in the programme budget and will be managed by the Danish Embassy in Accra.

**Strategic monitoring of regional trends** has been incorporated in PSE 1 and leverages UNODC’s central role and organisational advantage (see section 4.4).

**Policy agenda driven thematic reports** as exemplified in the study by UNODC ‘Pirates of the Niger Delta’ funded by Denmark and co-publish with the MFA. Similar reports could cover, for example, political economy aspects of piracy, Women, Peace and Security in the Maritime Domain or other topical issues

## Financial management

The financial management of MFA funding shall be in accordance with [Denmark’s Financial Management Guidelines](https://amg.um.dk/en/programmes-and-projects/financial-management/) for Development Cooperation (October 2019). Financial Management of MOD/DCD funding shall be following the applicable financing and accounting procedures governing finances in these two institutions.

The financial management of PSEs 1 and 2 will follow the rules and regulations of UNODC and INTERPOL, respectively, both of which have a proven track record of sound and robust financial management and sufficient backup mechanisms should these be needed. Both organisations utilise accounting systems that are in accordance with International Accounting Standards (IAS/IPSAS).[[25]](#footnote-26)

The financial management of PSE 3 is delegated to KAIPTC and will utilise KAIPTC’s financial management arrangements that adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Accounting Standards. The financial management of PSE 4 will follow Danish national regulations as they apply to MOD/DCD and sub-ordinate authorities. Financial input to all PSE 4 Financial Reports will be generated by the Danish military implementing entities via Defence Command Denmark and provided to the Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja.

The MSPA and MEL Coordinator will prepare and coordinate biannual financial reports on the engagements that through the Embassy in Accra will be submitted to the PSF Secretariat.

## Anti-corruption measures

West Africa is one of the most corrupt areas in the World. The corruption risks associated with the programme are assessed as low given that none of the engagements envisages significant financial transfers to third parties; in the case of PSEs 1 and 2, UNODC and INTERPOL have strong financial management practices in place. In the case of PSE 3, KAIPTC will be responsible for managing the Danish contribution. The Centre has been a long-standing Danish partner and has sufficiently strong systems in place. PSE 4 funds will be controlled by DCD and subordinate authorities.

Denmark has a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption, and all suspected cases shall be reported. The PSEDs, therefore, stress that strict measures must be in place to minimise the risk of corruption or misappropriation of funds. Any suspected case of corruption or misappropriation of funds related to the programme must immediately report to the Danish MFA or DMD regardless of whether or not the funds involved are Danish funds and irrespective of whether the case has been successfully handled or not. Failing satisfactory implementation of the above, the Danish support may be withdrawn, and a claim for refund of monies previously transferred may be made, and, in case of gross negligence, mismanagement or outright abuse, legal redress may be sought.

## Communicating results

A communications framework is attached at Annex 7 and sets out the arrangements for various types of messaging in relation to the programme’s purpose, priorities, and results. The framework notes that effective coordination and targeting of communications is essential and that the Danish Embassy in Accra will take this role in relation to major communications. The key stakeholders involved are the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja, the Danish MFA, DMD, DCD. With regard to the implementing partners for PSEDs 1, 2 and 3, it is expected that UNODC, INTERPOL and KAIPTC will produce/update biannual fact sheets and quarterly notes on success stories (also on their homepages and social media) as well as knowledge dissemination through training and workshop events. DCD and PSE 4 associated entities such as the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC) will ensure public domain communication products as suitable to the substance of their work.

# Risk management

Several contextual, programmatic, and institutional risk factors that could affect the programme’s implementation are outlined together with the necessary risk management measures in Annex 5. As outlined in section 5.5, strategic, programme and engagement levels of monitoring link adaptive management of the DMSP 3 to risk management, including the MTR. Contextual political economy risks related to underdevelopment, poor governance, environmental degradation, and politically motivated violence have been identified and will to, to some extent, be monitored, including through the Monitoring Hub. Continued political priority given to maritime domain governance Gulf of Guinea coastal countries is, for the most part, outside of the DMSP 3 sphere of influence (although as such Denmark through Special Envoy is scaling related diplomatic efforts), and a reversal of political engagement by influential countries (such as Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, or Côte d’Ivoire) would be challenging. The COVID-19 pandemic will continue to be a contextual risk, especially considering the slower than desired rates of vaccinations in the countries involved. At activity level, engagement partners have become skilful in managing activities in a COVID-19 responsible manner, but there is a residual risk of a cumulative impact on the programme’s results.

At programme-level, annual monitoring, and the MTR, as well as day-to-day oversight will address the risk of siloed approaches by engagement partners to implementation. The DMSP 3’s strengthened strategic management is designed to promote information sharing and coordination. At engagement-level, management or risks identified has been transferred to engagement partners (UNODC, INTEROL) with proven track records in managing risks associated with VBSS training. With exception of the engagement in prisons (where sentences could well go beyond the DMSP 3 period of implementation and risk management mechanisms) all activities are self-contained within the implementation period. Risk management of directly implemented non-ODA engagements are subject to the high standards on managing associated risks mandated and practiced by DCD.

# Sustainability and Exit

At an overall level, the approach to sustainability is reflected in the choice of two specialised agencies, i.e., UNODC and INTERPOL that have been, and will be responding to piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea because of their inherent mandate to do so. Danish support provided is enabling these organisations to accelerate and scale-up transfer good practice (for example, the UNODC VBSS), or leverage capacity built in related projects (as is the case for INTERPOL and the regional network of maritime policy experts established under the US funded project AGWE). By prioritising a strategic fit as a connector and enabler of joined-up ECJC responses the DMSP 3 furthermore contributes to sustainability of effort at the national level and regional levels. KAIPTC and WPSI are well-established institutions, with a key comparative advantage of breadth and depth of networks of African policy makers and practitioners, good reputations and political support and access are independent of Danish support. Investments made in capacity-building related to MDA and Operational Response are made in human resources and equipment that will continue to be available when Danish engagement ends. Moreover, since all Danish engagement are harmonised with EU, UN, and bilateral international engagements, for example the US OBANGAME EXPRESS exercises, sustainability is furthermore enhanced through the related fora.

PSE 1, PSE 2 and PSE 4’s approach to sustainability is through alignment with national MLE institutions and navies in the context of maritime commitments and priorities that authorities in Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo pursue based on a combination of national interests, and commitments to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and related architecture.

PSE 3 approach to sustainability is similar in the sense that it aligns with national and regional authorities and institutions, but it has an additional comparative advantage of policy level engagements that are founded on a strong basis of African ownership.

1. Interpol is not engaged in Cameroon within DMSP III. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Delineation of the GoG vary, this report follows the convention used in *Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea* (Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Jonannes Riber Norby, 2015) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. [Pirates of the Niger Delta (2021) UNODC and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark](https://www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria/documents/UNODC_Pirates_of_the_Niger_Delta_between_brown_and_blue_waters.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. <https://www.standard-club.com/knowledge-news/news-imb-piracy-and-armed-robbery-report-q2-2021-3726/> (International Maritime Bureau, 2021) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. See Annex 1 Context Analysis for details [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. UN General Assembly, Oceans, and the law of the sea: report of the Secretary-General, 10 March 2008, A/63/63, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/48da24e72.html [accessed 8 October 2021] [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. *Stable Seas: Gulf of Guinea* (Stable Seas and ICC, 2020) [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. See also the IMO resource page [West and Central Africa Regional Agreements and Information Sharing (imo.org)](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/Code-of-Conduct-against-illicit-maritime-activity.aspx) [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Cameroon only within PSE 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. It should be noted that a planned engagement with the IMO was awarded to UNODC instead because UNODC had such regional presence and implementation capacity, and the IMO did not. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. See [www.kaiptc-danishmaritimesecurityproject.org/](http://www.kaiptc-danishmaritimesecurityproject.org/) Research papers include: International Forum on the Status of Implementation of the Yaoundé Protocol; Towards a Model State Action at Sea for Gulf of Guinea States; Mapping Maritime Actors under the Yaoundé Protocol: Establishing mandates, inter-relationships and Prospects; Examining, the gendered dimensions of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea; Political Economy of maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea; Prosecuting Maritime Crimes in the Gulf of Guinea; Pandemics and the future of Maritime security operations in the Gulf of Guinea; Operationalising normative frameworks in the Gulf of Guinea; Reducing ‘sea blindness’ in the maritime domain: the role of non-state actors. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. <https://www.stableseas.org/services> [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. <https://www.stableseas.org/post/gauging-maritime-security-in-west-and-central-africa> (Stable Seas 2020, 2020b) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Interpol is not engaged in Cameroon within DMSP III. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. . See page 65 of the relevant [OECD DAC Guidance](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC(2017)22/FINAL/en/pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. The UNODC technical assistance on this handover agreement was funded by the [EU SVAIMS UNODC Project](https://www.unodc.org/nigeria/en/unodc-set-to-tackle-maritime-piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea.html) and is anticipated to become an addendum to the [ECOWAS Convention on Extradition of 1994](https://www.wacapnet.com/sites/www.wacapnet.com/files/general/convention_on_extradition.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. [WPSI](https://wpsi.kaiptc.org/key-personnel/) is currently supported by Denmark for on-land focussed WPS activities. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. PSE 1 has a total engagement budget of DKK 40.4 million be governed by separate Funding Agreements: an agreement with MFA on DKK 27.7 million ODA for 2022-2026 (60 months), and an agreement with MoD on DKK 12.5 million non-ODA. The latter is presented in table 12 in section 4.7.4 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. INTERPOL’s maritime security project AGWE is not covering Cameroon [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. See also section 2.7 on the confirmed DAC- ability of this workstream. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. UNSCR 2039 (2012), Peace Consolidation in West Africa, S/RES/2039. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. For example: Mapping needs, responses, and actors; Mapping national and regional maritime legal and policy texts; Reviewing and projecting implementation requirements of specific regional and legal policy documents; Exploring the nature and dimensions of piracy, robbery, and crime at sea; Gender aspects of maritime security; Maritime-related prosecutions and the case disposal successes and challenges; Sea-based environmental degradation; Exploring the link between piracy and terrorism. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Assignment of lead role on PSE 4 between MMA-Abuja and MA-Accra is at the discretion of DCD [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. IAS issued by the International Accounting Standards Board. RDE will conducted financial assessment of INTERPOL [↑](#footnote-ref-26)