## **Contextual risks**

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response** | **Residual risk** | **Background to assessment** |
| Root causes of piracy on land in the Niger Delta insufficiently addressed | **Very likely** | **Minor** | The programme responds to the effects of contextual political economy risks related to underdevelopment, poor governance, environmental degradation, and politically motivated violence that have been identified and to some extent will be monitored, including through the Monitoring Hub. A better understanding of root causes may be included as research theme under DMSP 3 and addressed through Denmark’s multilateral partners, notably the EU. | **Minor** | See Annex 1. |
| COVID-19 pandemic impacts pace of implementation and achievement of results | **Very likely** | **Major** | As regards to COVID-19 response and preparedness, adaptive programming by the programme’s management (Defence Command Denmark (DCD), UNODC, and KAIPTC) has laid a sound foundation for meeting ongoing and current constraints and risk.  Partners have gained skills and experience to deliver despite COVID-19 impacts. DMSP 3 will build on the foresight to expedite UNODC’s installation of video teleconferencing equipment for nine maritime security agencies in Ghana and eight in Nigeria and additional units being available at MLE authorities donated through the EU-funded and SWAIMS implemented by UNODC.  INTERPOL also gained experience in COVID-19 alternative implementation in all beneficiary countries during the US-funded Project AGWE in the latter years. | **Minor** | The MTR (June 2021) concluded DMSP 2 progress has been made despite the multifaceted and cascading impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Adaptive programme- and engagement management by the representations in Accra and Abuja has demonstrated tenacity.  The collaboration and coordination between the two on the ground has been exemplary. A solid partnership foundation has been achieved with the UNODC and KAIPTC on which to build in DMSP 3. Similarly, DCD and (independently of DMSP 2) INTERPOL have acquired COVID-19 adapted management skills. Moreover, counterparts in general have acquired e-collaboration skills through the most used platforms (Zoom and Cisco Webex platforms in particular). |
| Changes in government priorities away from maritime security | **Unlikely** | **Major** | Constant monitoring of the political landscape, including at institutional level by the Danish Embassies, UNODC, and KAIPTC – drawing also upon EU assessments.  Dialogue with government stakeholders (esp. GMA and NIMASA) at senior level in concert with other donors. Development of scenarios and risk responses. | **Minor** risk in the short to medium term. | There will be a likely ‘leading by example’ effect by the Nigerian initiation in June 2021 of the highly anticipated Integrated National Security and Waterways Protection Infrastructure, the Deep Blue Project, under the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA). Designed for the total spectrum of maritime security and better maritime domain awareness, including intelligence, the Deep Blue Project is the first intergovernmental and integrated maritime security project in West and Central Africa. |
| Further deterioration in maritime security situation in the GoG | **Likely** | **Significant** | The overall security situation in the GoG region is deteriorating with rising numbers of piracy and other maritime crimes occurring unabated. Piracy and other maritime crime related financial flows feed on land crime networks of kingpins, sponsors interlink with corrupt officials, and have become bolder and more capable deep offshore pirates who target international shipping traffic as well as coastal low-reach pirates, who operate up to 40 nautical miles from shore and primarily target local vessels. | **Major** but depends upon extent of escalation and acceleration and effectiveness of ECJC counter measures. Difficult to predict with trends in piracy and other maritime crime to be closely monitored. | There has been an increasing trend towards offshore attacks off the coast of Nigeria (including kidnap for ransom) and a private sector now considering scoping for armed guards on board vessels. The beginning of piracy convictions in Nigerian and Togo provide a counter trend to the increasing sophistication of piracy and the criminal networks that feed on the related illicit economy. |

**Programmatic risks**

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response** | **Residual risk** | **Background to assessment** |
| Siloed approaches to implementation by UNODC, INTERPOL, KAIPTC, and DCD | **Likely** | **Major** | Continue to build on good relations established as part of DMSP 2 and promote coordination and exploitation of synergies through the newly established  Cross Engagement Coordination Committee. | **Minor**, but weak buy-in may also affect implementation. The programme builds upon existing good relations between implementing partners and local stakeholders. | Existing collaboration between UNODC and INTERPOL and the fact that DCS already independently contribute to OBANGAME EXPRESS exercises implies that the programme builds on existing relations and collaboration rather than expecting new relations to be effective.  However, the in principle agreed collaboration between KAIPTC and UNODC needs careful attention since it is new and regarding a new theme in the programme in the WPS-agenda. |
| Fragmented and output focused monitoring and evaluation | **Likely** | **Major** | Locally recruited MEL tasked to coordinate M&E under the coordination of the MSPA. Priority given to the establishment of a strong MEAL culture across the DMSP 3 in the initial phase of the program. Development of MEAL plan essential in this regard. | **Minor**. Once partners are coordinated and committed to synergetic monitoring, the MEL can be assumed to be able to guide the process and collate partner monitoring results in the mandatory PSF reporting formats.  Investment in UNODC virtual Donor Technical Group and related regular reporting on regional indicators will further mitigate the risk. | There is a structural gap in the alignment framework with UNODC because there is no regional GoG maritime ECJC programme articulated by UNODC. The DMSP 3 can therefore only align with UNODC GMCP approach. Relatedly, there is no regional ECJC results framework, and neither UNODC nor INTERPOL have had incentives to collaborate on country MLE profiles. Both agencies have committed to do so as part of the DMSP 3.  UNODC’s commitment to act as convener of a virtual donor technical group and regularly provide updates means the DMSP 3 is poised to make a key contribution to address the practice and continued risk of fragmented and output focussed monitoring. |
| Turnover in staff at key institutions, including course participants, complicates implementation and reduces impact | **Likely** to varying degrees | **Minor** but depends upon individual case | Maintain focus on areas that have political and operational priority and buy-in. Emphasise importance of continuity in staff and reach agreement on this with sending institutions. | **Minor**. Would lead to delays in the short to medium term if there is significant change/rotation of staff. Key priority areas are likely to remain relevant. Impact depends upon individuals concerned.  Nb. Could also be beneficial. | Changes in staff may be felt in terms of delays in decision-making and adjustments to budgets. The severity will depend upon the concrete situation. |
| ICC lacks capacity to fully take a leadership role | **Likely** | **Major** (for regional aspects) | Include ICC in programming and support its capacity development and linkages to regional coordination and national structures.  Especially UNODC and KAIPTC can mitigate the risk via existing networks and collaboration with ICC. | **Likely**. Absence of strong ICC leadership limits the pressure it can place on regional states to fulfil their pledges, e.g., regarding staffing. | ICC is slowly but steadily building up its role and capacity. The Yaoundé structure require member states to contribute staff, equipment, and infrastructure, and to develop coordination arrangements, including legal arrangements.  ICC has a key role in promoting this. |
| Government partners lack capacity to implement agreed activities (e.g., training exercises) and programme progress is thus less strong than expected | **Likely** | **Major** | Capacity development support included in all engagements is based on assessment of capacity limitations. Monitoring and tailoring of delivery (via annual work plan) to assessment of possibly shortfalls. Regular dialogue. | **Likely** long-term risks reduced, although it may not be possible to avoid some knock-on effects for speed (and possibly also extent) of implementation. Focus on priority inputs. | Institutional capacity is affected also by political will for reform, and this may vary according to the area concerned. High staff turnover will further negatively impact absorption capacity.  Shortfalls in this area are foreseen by the mix of national and direct implementation modality. |

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| Sudden changes in deployment plans by partners where Danish contributions form integrated elements (PSE 4 only) | **Unlikely** | **Significant** | Maintain forward-looking dialogue via bilateral informal/formal contacts (MOD/DCD, units) and ensure commitment to early notice of any changes. | **Minor** but likely to remain as Denmark is a junior partner in several engagement areas. | Some other partners have shorter commitment periods (typically one year), and this makes them vulnerable to changes. |
| Agreements allowing deployment of military trainers are not in place from outset and may have implications for deployment of DK personnel | **Likely** | **Minor** | Maintain contacts with counterparts/ other partners and seek completion of agreement. Ensure fall back arrangements are in place. | **Minor**. Interim arrangements allow temporary presence of DK advisors/trainers. | Interim arrangements allow temporary presence of DK advisors/trainers. |
| Not possible to identify suitable candidates for advisory positions | **Unlikely** | **Major** | Danish Embassies to ensure early identification of candidates through existing systems and that rotation arrangements are in place. May need to adjust job descriptions. DK SOF and other experts considered to be less at risk, except if urgent operational requirements arise elsewhere. | **Major**. The long-term nature of most positions should enable candidates to be identified. But it may also prove difficult to find the right match and to attract qualified people to the key MPSA and MEL positions. Experience with recruitment of a qualified CMA in Nigeria was positive. To build on the experience and institutional memory, rolling over the current DMSP 2 CMA to phase 3 would be in the programme’s interest. | Since skills required for the MSPA are at regional and international level (including fluent English and French since beneficiary countries are francophone). For the two locally recruited advisors it may be difficult to identify candidates with the correct profiles within the available remuneration categories. |

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| Duplication of effort with other donors | **Unlikely** | **Minor** | UNODC and INTERPOL are well positioned to avoid this, and their proposals for DMPS 3 outline how duplication is avoided and complementarities are achieved. The Virtual DTG (see above) will furthermore reduce the risk. | **Minor** as implementing partners is in regular contact and this will be facilitated by UNODC through the virtual DTG. | The risk varies but the key actors are connected, and this means there is a general overview of which partner is active in which area. A more formalised exchange of information would be useful and has been agreed with UNODC, who is taking the lead. |

## **Institutional risks**

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| **Risk Factor** | **Likelihood** | **Impact** | **Risk response** | **Residual risk** | **Background to assessment** |
| Programme funds or equipment misused or diverted to other use by partners (fiduciary and reputational risk for Denmark) | **Unlikely** | **Significant** | Zero tolerance for corruption/fraud. For PSEs 1, 2, and 3, financial procedures are set out in SOPs. Regularly reviewed and subject to audit. Cases of corruption/misuse would lead to termination of support. | **Limited** but cannot be excluded. | Most funds are held and managed by INTERPOL and UNODC, which have sound systems in place. KAIPTC has shown slowness in financial reporting but no irregularities have been reported. |
| Risk of inadvertently causing harm – PSE 4 and possibly PSE 1 (reputational risk for Denmark) | **Unlikely** | **Major** | Risk assessments undertaken. Capacity building provided to raise awareness. Prioritise transparency and accountability. Encourage information flow and monitoring by diverse range of actors. | **Limited** but cannot be excluded. | The risks here primarily concern the recipients of DK support, who are ignoring human rights standards, including in the prisons that are to be refurbished. Relatedly, at the outset of the DMSP 3, no other likeminded donors have engaged in this dimension of the ECJC. Although risks are transferred to UNODC, there is the risk of association in the public domain as well as an exit-of-project risk related to convicts that will remain in prisoned after a Danish exit. |
| Support to institutions by Denmark leads to reputational damage due to human rights shortcomings | **Likely** | **Major** | The target of increasing VBBS, arrests, and detentions as part of the ECJC will inherently place more individuals in the hands of MLE institutions.  UNODC and INTERPOL VBSS training is human rights compliant and will be strengthened to also be fully up to date on WPS. | **Limited** but cannot be excluded | By training MLE in VBSS, Denmark is only directly exposed to the risk during training in the case of DCD’s live exercises. Still, since the training is provided with the intention that the MLE agencies thereafter independently increase the number of VBSS and, presumably, arrests, Denmark can be associated with their performance and adherence to human rights and WPS standards (for example in a scenario in which a VBSS uncovers women and children as victims of human trafficking). |